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E SSA Y
UNCONTROLLABLE URGES AND IRRATIONAL PEOPLE
Stephen I. JV!orse'
A single strong desire is' ojren enough to leave a man no peoce.
If he is seized by two contmry desires or the same time, the effect
can easily be imagined.

Alessandro Manzoni 1
INTRODUCTION

I NCARCERATION, whether in a prison or a treatment facility,
i requires weighty justification in a society committed to the protection of civil liberty. T he United States Supreme Court has recognized, in both the criminal and civil contexts, that citizens have
immense interests in liberty and in freedom from other adverse so2
cial consequences, such as stigma. The basic justification for
criminal confinement is that a culpable offender has been convicted of a crime; the basic justification for involuntary civil
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Relations). Harvard University. I thank Adam Candeub, Sherry Colb, Joel Dvoskin,
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1
Alessandro Manzoni, The Betrothed 316 (Bruce Penman trans., 1972) (1840).
'E.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425-26 (1979) (recognizing that civil
commitment is a "significant deprivation of liberty'' that can cause "adverse social
consequences," such as stigma, which can have a "very significant impact on the
individual"); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,509 (1972) (emphasizing, in dictum,
that civil commitment is a "massive curtailment of liberty"); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 363-64 (1970) (stating that due process requires imposition of a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard in criminal trials because defendants have "at stake
interests of immense importance"-liberty and freedom from stigma). See generally
Sherry F. Colb, Freedom From Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 781,787-94 (1994) (arguing that liberty is a
fundamental right).
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confinem e nt is that the person is not responsibl e for hi s or he r potentially dangerous conduct.} The danger a person may pose is a
justi ficatio n for criminal and civil confine ment. but o ur soci e ty
doc s not p e rmit preve ntive confineme nt for soci a l safe ty base d on
dangerousness a lon e .' Th e criminal and ci vil confin e m e nt sys tems
thu s le ave a "ga p" in their ability to confine d angero us agents."

' St c:p hc n J . l'vl o rsc . Ne ith e r D ese rt No r Di sease . 5 Lega l Th eo n ' 265,26 7-70 ( 1999)
' Ka nsas v. He ndr ic ks. 52 1 U .S. 346, 358 (1 997 ) (·· ;\ fin d in g of d a nge ro usness.
~ tandin g alon e . is o rdinaril y not a suffici e nt gro und Ufl l lll whi ch to just ify indefinit e
in vo luntary co mmitm e nt."" ). The re are limite d excc pti u ns. suc h <IS de ni a l of bail to
so m e da ngero us de fe ndant s, but e ve n such e xce ption s are few a nd a rc stri c tl y tim e
limite d. Se e United States v. Sal e rno, 48 1 U.S. 739 ( ll)07). Th e quara ntine of people
with un co ntro llabl e infecti o us diseases is a noth er e xcepti o n. but the bas is fo r such a n
incarce rati o n is no t da nge ro us human action. Co mpagni e Fra ncaise cle Na viga tion a
V ap e ur v. La. State Bel. o f Health , 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1 902) (a ffirmin g the po wer o f
the sta tes to e nact qu a rantin e laws for the safe ty a nd pro tectio n o f th e health o f th e ir
inhabit ants).
' See Steph e n J. M o rse , Fe ar of Dange r, Flight from Culpa bility , 4 Psycho !. Pu b.
Pol' y & L. 250, 256- 58 (1 998). See ge ne ra lly Ste ph e n J. Schulh ofe r, Two Sys te ms o f
Social Protection: Comme nts on the C ivil-Criminal Distin ction, With Pa rticul a r
Refe re nce to Sexua lly Vi o le nt Pre dator Laws, 7 J. Contc mp. Legal Iss ues 69, 92- 93
(1996) (desc ribing t he Foucha proble m conce rning the preventi ve dete ntion o f
dange rous but sane individu a ls).
In a recent Comme ntary , Professor Paul Robinson sugges ts that va riou s crimin a l
justice me th ods th a t substa ntially e nh ance criminal in ca rce ra tio n, such a s ha bitu a l
offend er laws. are be ing used improperly to fill th e gap. He claims that such method s
a re a fo rm o f pure preventi ve dete ntion because e nhanced prison te rms a re
dispro po rtion a te to th e offe nder 's dese rt. Professor R o binso n proposes th a t rath er
than "cloaking"' pre ve ntive dete ntion in the gui se o f crimin al puni shm e nt , soci a l
safe ty a nd respect fo r criminal law would be be tte r serve d if th e la w stra ig htfo rwardl y
segrega ted pro porti o nat e punishme nt a nd pre ve ntive detenti o n and a dopte d postcon viction civil commitm e nt bas e d solely o n dange rousness. H e claim s that using civil
commitme nt to pro tect socie ty in the segr egate d sys te m would pro vid e mo re checks
on unjustifi e d loss to liberty than would using th e criminal justi ce sys te m to impose
dispro porti o na te se nte nces . Paul H. Robinson , Puni shin g D angero usn e ss: Cloaking
Preve nti ve D e te nti o n as Criminal Justice, 114 H a rv. L. R e v. 1429, 1429-32 (2001).
I agree th a t many criminal justice pra ctices impose harsh a nd di spropo rtion a te
punishme nts and tha t pe rhaps pure preve ntive de te ntio n would be justified by publi c
safe ty co nce rn s, if pre dictive accura cy wer e suffi cientl y great. See Ste ph e n J. Morse,
Blame ancl D a nge r: An E ssay on Preventive D e te ntion , 76 B.U. L. R e v. 113, 141-51
(1996) (a cce pting the pote ntial the oretica l justifia bility o f pure preve nti ve de tentio n
to pro mote public sa fety but arguing that , un de r current co nditi o ns, it wo uld be
unjustifiable because it de hum a nizes de tain ees and becau se curre nt pre dictiv e
techniques a re ina cc urate). I se e little re ason to be lieve . ho weve r, tha t th e a llege dly
ben e fi cial " protecti o ns " of ind efinite civil commitme nt wo ul d effec tively protec t
libe rt y. For exampl e, I stro ngly do ubt tha t a peri odic revi e w of sexuall y viol e nt peopl e
civill y co mmitt e d so le ly fo r d a nge ro usness a t th e e nd o f a pri so n te rm would le ad to
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U nd o ubtedly, dange rou s citizens who have committed no crim e or
who have completed their sentences must be left at liberty if they
a re responsible.
Sex ua l predators fa ll int o the gap betwe e n cr imin a l and civil co nfine ment. They are rou tin e ly held full y responsible a nd b lameworth y
for th e ir be ha vior because they almost always reta in subs tantial ca pa city fo r rationality, they re main entire ly in touch with re<llit y.
a nd they know the applica ble moral and lega l r ul es. Co nsequent ly.
eve n if their sexual viole nce is in part cause d by a men tal a bno rm a lit y, they do not m ee t the usual standards for an in sanity defe nse.''
Fo r the same reason, the y do not meet the us ua l no n-responsi bi lity
sta ndards for civil commitment and retain th e compe tence to m a ke
ra ti o na l decision s abo ut trea tment. Moreover, in most cases in
w hich civil commitme nt is justified , most states n o longer main ta in
ro utin e indefinite involuntary civil commitm en t but instead te nd to
limit the p e rmissibl e le ngth of commitment.
7
To fill the gap , Kansas and a substanti a l min ority of other states
have adopted a form of indefinite involuntary civil commitment
ea rli e r re lease than enh anced prison terms. Alth o ugh pure preventive det e nti o n
proceed ings are civil and thus sho uld re quire appli cation of a " least intrusive mea ns"
principle. I doubt th at many co urts would be lik e ly to fin d mea ns less intrusive th a n
co nfineme nt sufficient to protec t th e public fro m crimin a ls with a hi story o f sex ua l
vio le nce . Moreover . wh y sho ul d pure pre ventive d e te ntion re quire prior crimina l o r
o th e r d a nge rous co ndu ct as a s ubsta ntive, ra the r th a n as a n evid e nti a ry. crit erio n? If
the civil co mmitme nt is preve nti ve co nfin e ment base d o n future dangerousn ess a lo ne
a nd is not dese rve d p uni shm e nt fo r p as t conduct. the re is no nee d to rel y o n prior
cond uct at all. Pure preve ntive d e tention is like ly to be a gre ate r int rusion on libe rt y
and e ve n more costly th an e nh anced criminal puni shment. T he Supreme Court is
ri g ht to hold that preve ntive d e te ntion should not be base d o n dangerousness a lone .
Fin a ll y, unenhanced but substa nti al prison terms for se ri o usly violent offe nd e rs bot h
a re dese rve d and would protect th e public by incapacit at in g th e o ffe nd er.
' Co nsid er the remarks of Justice Owen Dixon o f Au stra lia in King v. Porrer (1933)
55 C. L.R. 182. 187 :
[A ] great numbe r of peo ple who come into a C rimin a l Co urt are ab no rm a l.
T hey wo uld not be th e re if th ey were the norm a l type of ave rage everyd ay
people. Man y of the m a re ve ry p eculiar in the ir di spositi o ns and peculi arly
te mpe red . That is marke dl y the case in sex ua l o ffe nes [sic]. Neverth e less, th ey
are mentally quite able to appr eciate what th ey are do in g and quite abl e to
appreciate th e threa te ned p uni shment of the law and the wrongne ss of the ir
ac ts. and they are held in ch eck by the prosp ec t of puni shm e nt.
' B ri e f of the States of Illin o is, Alabama , Arizo na, Cali fo rni a, D e laware. F lorid a,
Io wa . Maryland. Massac huse tts, Miss issippi, Misso uri , N eb raska, New Jersey, North
D ako ta. Oklahoma, Penn sy lva ni a, South Carolin a , W as hington and Wisconsin as
Am ici C uri ae in Suppo rt of Pet ition e r at 2 n.l , Kan sas v. Cra ne . 534 U.S. 407 (2002)
(No . 00-957) (stating th at sixtee n sta tes have e nacted me nt a ll y ab norm a l sex ua l

l .
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that applies to ·'sexuall y violent predators who have a mental abnormality or personality disord er."" The Kansas definition of a
sexually violent predator. whi ch is similar to tho se that o ther states
have adopted, is " an y perso n who ha s been convicted of or charged
with a sexually viol ent offense and who suffers fr om a mental abnormality or perso nality disorder wh ich makes the person likel y to
9
e ngage in repeat act:s of se xual vio lence. " Th e state m ay impose
thi s fo rm of civil co mmitm e nt not only when a person has been
charged vvith or convicted cf a sex ua l offe nse but also after an alleged predator has cornplete d a prison term for precisely that type
of sexually violent co nd uct. Commitment is for an indefinite period , and thus potential ly for life . although an an nual rev iew of the
validity of the commitment is required.
In Kan sas v. Hend ricks ,1 the Supreme Court rejected a substantive due process cha llenge to the constitutionality of the Kansas
statute. The majority's primary rationale was that the Kansas criteria were similar to civil commitment criteria that the Court had
long approved. 11 The Court emphasized that states were free to use
any terminology they wished and did not need to use the specific
nomenclature of any professional group, such as psychiatrists. 12
Thus, Kansas was permitted to make "mental abnormality," which
is not a recognized diagnostic term in psychiatry or psychology, a
predicate for commitment. The Co urt properly looked beyond lab els, however, to determine what potentially justifiable ground for
civil commitment the criterion represented . In this case, civil commitment was justified because the mental abnormality or
personality disord e r criterion limited confinement
(1

to those who suffer fro m a vo litional impairment rendering them
dangerous beyond their control. The Kansas Act . .. requires a
preda tor commitment laws). A s o f 1998, mo re than 520 people we re co mmitted in the
twe lve sta tes that had th e n adopted such commitm ent la ws. Roxa nne Lieb & Scott
Matso n, Wash. State lnst. for Pub. Policy , Sex ual Predator Co mmitm ent Laws in the
Unit ed States: 1998 Upd ate , at i ( 1998), available at http://www.wa.gov/wsipp.
' Ka n. Stat. An n. §§ 59-29a0 1- 59-29a20 (Supp. 2000). Kan sas amend e d its statute
afte r Kan sas v. Hendricks wa s decid ed. The ve rsio n of th e statute considered by the
Court, whi ch can be found atK an. Stat. Ann .§ 59-29a01-59-2 9a15 (1 994) , appli e d to
men tally abn ormal sexu al pred ators.
1
' I d.§ 59-29a02 (a).
w 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
11 Id. at 357-58.
" Id. at 358- 59.

.;''
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fi nding of future dangerousness. ancl then links that fi nding to
the existence of a ·'mental abnorma lity" or "personality disorder " that makes it diffic ult , if not impossib le, fo r the person to
co ntrol his dan ge rous beha vior . . .. The precommitment requirement of a '" ment 8l 8bnorn1<1lity" or "pe rso nality
dis order· ' ... narrows the class of persons eligible for confin emen t to th ose who are una ble to co ntro l th eir dangerousn ess.1'
T h us, loss of control was appare ntl y the crucia l non-respon sibility
co ndition. Indeed , thi s was precise ly the type of problem alleged ly
exhib ited by Hendricks, who ha d a hi sto ry of multipl e convictio ns
fo r sex ual m olestation of chi ld ren and who described himse lf as
having uncontrollable urges to mol est children when he was
stressed . A ccording to Hendricks, only death could preve nt those
urges from occurring.
14
In Kansas v. Crane , the Supreme Co urt was asked to decide
"[w] hether the F ourtee nth A m endmen t's Due Proce ss Clause requires a state to prove that a sexually violent predator 'cannot
control' his criminal se xual behavior befo re the State can civilly
commit him for residential care and treatme nt. " 15 In In re Crane,
the Supreme Court of Ka nsas had again addressed its sexual predator commitment criteria to decide whether substantive due process,
as interpreted in Hendricks , required an inability to control dangerous conduct as a predicate for commitment. Crane had been
committed because the commitme nt t rial co urt fo und beyond a
reasonable doubt that he suffe red from a mental disorder that
made him likely to re-offe nd. A ccording to the trial court, K ansas
did no t h ave to prove an impairment of volitional control. 17 T he
Ka nsas Supreme Court reversed , pointing to the United States Supreme Court's repeated use of the co ncept of lack of control to
justify its decision in Hendricks. s
T he State argued that Hendricks does not suggest that a control
defect is the exclusive constitutional criteri on fo r sexual predator
1
'

1

'' Id. at 358 (intern al citations omitted) .
'' 534 U.S. 407 (2002) .
'' Petition for a Writ of Ce rti orari to the Supre me Court of Kansa s at i, Kansas v.
Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No . 00-957).
'' 7 P.3d 285 (Kan. 2000) .
" Icl. at 287- 88.
" Id. at 289- 91,294.
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commitments . Rather. Hendricks should be unde rstood as limi ted
to its facts , wh ich so le ly conce rned a control prob lem . Mo reover.
the control sta ndard is so inherentl y de fi cie nt tha t it can no t rationally be th e so le constitutional standard. T hu s, an y ca usa ll y
pre d ispos ing link be tween a ment a l abnormality . espe cia ll y a p e rsonal ity disorde r. a nd sexua l vio le nce (th e .. causa l lin k·· standard)
shou ld be sufficien t. C ran e argu ed t hat He/1(/ricl::.s· orovicl es a clea r.
limiting. an d exclusive stan da rd fo r the con stituti o nally pe rmissibl e
com mitment of all ege d preda tors and that th e standard Kansas
sugges te d was to o bro ad. Crane thu s prese nted a wa tershed opport uni ty for th e Supreme Court to clarify both th e non-re spo nsibility
cond ition that justifies civil commitment of m entall y abnorm a l
sexual predators and the cons titutiona l limits on p reventive d ete ntion.
Jus tice Ste phen Breyer 's majorit y opini on rejec ted pure preve ntive civil de tention based on dangerousness a lone and held that
substan ti ve due process required "proof of se rious difficulty in controlling behavior" as a predicate for th e civil commitment of
19
ment a lly abnormal sexual predators. Although the Court constitutionalized the lack of control standard , it reject ed th e argume nt
that the lack had to be " total or complete " because such a standard
211
was unwork able. T he Court reiterated th at both the mental ab21
normality or personality disorder criteria and a lack of control
22
criterion were n ecessary to narrow the class of persons e ligibl e for
confine ment. T hese strict eligibility requiremen ts preve nt such
co mmitments fro m becoming mech a nisms for retributi o n o r d e te rrence, which are justifications for crimin al puni shment but not fo r
civil commitment.".1 T he Co urt noted th at , in H en dricks , the prese nce of an undeniably serious mental disord e r that crea te d a
'' speci al and serious lack of ability to con tro l behavior" was crucial
24
to justify the civil nature of the commitment.
Defining the quantum of lack of control necessa ry to justify
these onerous civil commitments thus assumes supreme constitu~

'" K ansa s v. Cra ne . 534 U .S. 407. 122 S. Ct. 867, 870 (2002 ).
I cl.
' I Id .
., lei.
,, ld.
,, Jd.

Cll

l
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ti o na! importance, but the Crane opinion provides little guid a nce .
Th e re levant langua ge is worth quoting in full:
In recognizing that [lack of control is required], we di d not give
to th e phrase '·Jack of control " a particularly narrow or technical meaning. A nd we recognize that in cases where lac k of
control is at iss ue , "in ability to control behavior " wi ll no t be
demonstrab le with mathematic al precisio n. lt is en ough to say
that th ere must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling beha vior. And thi s, when viewed in light of such fea tures of the
case as the nature of th e psychiatric diagnosi s, ancl th e sever ity
of the mentnl abnormality itse lf, must be sufficie nt to distingui sh the dangerous sexu al offend er whose serious mental
illn ess. abnorm ality, or disord er subj ec ts him to civi l commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an
25
ordinary criminal case.
T he Co urt characterized this language as a description of the in26
ability to control behavior in a "general sense."
The Court recognized that this is not a precise constitutional
standard, but asserted that constitutional safeguards of liberty in
m e ntal health law "are not always best enforced through precise
27
bright-line rules." The Court defended this assertion with two arguments. First, states have considerable discretion to define the
m ental abnormalities and personality disorders that are predicates
for civil commitment. Second, psychiatry , which informs but does
not control mental health law determinations, is "ever-advancing, "
and its " distinctions do not seek precise ly to mirror those of the
law." 2"' Consequently, Justice Breyer concluded , th e Court has provided constitutional guidance in the are a of mental health law " by
procee ding deliberately and contextually, elaborating generally
stated constitutional standards and objectives as specific circumstances require." 2y Finally, the Court implied, but did not decide ,
that the Constitution does not require that a serious control proble m must be caused by a volitional impairme nt. The Court

~-

1d.

~" lei.

" Id.
~' lei.
~'I

1cl .

at 871.
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suggested that an emotional o r cognitive impairment that caused a
sufficient control problem wou ld also pass constitutional muster.'~~
J ustice Antonin Scalia's di ssent argued that Hendricks he ld that
a causal link bet\vee n a ment al abnormality or a personality disorder and a propensity for sexual vi olence necessarily imp lied t hat
th ere was a contr ol proble m.-\\ T he jury verdict of commitment t hat
the Court reins tated in He ndricks contained no independe nt find ing of a control prob lem. T he co nstitution a lly accept able findin g of
loss of control in He ndricks ''must .. . have bee n embraced within
th e finding of menta! abnormality ca using future dangero usne ss.,,,,
Justice Scalia clefendecl this conclusion by noting th at agents who
are dan gero us because they suffer from a me ntal abnorm alit y arc
no t deterrabl e.' ' T hu s, the disse nt, too, accepted the nonresponsibility crit erio n for civil commitment and rejected preve ntive confinement for dangerousness alone, but disagreed with the
majority about what legal criterion implied lack of control. F or J ustice Scalia, the ca usa l link was sufficient to demonst rate the
requisite lack of control. Consequently, he rejected the majority 's
view that the Constitution requires an independent finding of lack
of control in addition to a mental abnormality and a resultant propensity for sexually vi o lent behavior.
The dissent also noted that the majority had reopened the question, which it claim ed H endricks had closed, of whether a volitional
impairment was the constitutionally required cause of the neces14
sary control problem. It argued that Hendricks made clear that
other causes, including emotional impairments, would also be acceptable. To hold othe rwise would make little sense because
cognitive and emotional impairments could surely cause a loss of
control.
Finally, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for the vagueness of
the control standard it adopted. " He conceded that the m ental abnormality or personality disorder criterion and the resulting

m

!d. at 871 - 72.

" Id. at 874 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ. , di sse ntin g).
-'~ Id.
'' lei. at 874; cf. King v . Port e r (I 933 ) 55 C. L.R. 182, 187 (Dixon. J.) (asse rting that
most sexual offe nders are clet e rrable by the threat of punishment).
"Cran e, 122 S. Ct. at 874-75.
,; lei. at 875-76.

•
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propensity for violence criterion were both coherent and, with the
assistance of exp ert testim o ny, wi thin the capacity of a normal j ury
to de termin e . But he chided the maj ority 's control standard as be ing so vague that it will give trial judges " not a clue " about how to
6
charge juries.' He speculated that th e majority offered no fu rther
elabo ra ti o n because "e lab o rati o n ... which passes the la ugh tesl is
17
imp ossible. '' J ust ic e Scalia wond e red whether th e test was a quantit ative m e asure o f loss of contro l capacity or of how fr e q uently the
ina bilit y to control ari ses.'' In the a lternative, he questione d
whe t her the standard was "adve rbial ,., a descriptive characte rizatio n of the ina bility to control one's pe nchant for se xua l violence .
T he adverbs he used as exampl es we re " appre ciably," ·'m oderate ly," " substantially," and '·a lmost totally."'') According to J ustice
Scalia, none of th ese could provide any guidance.
In short , Crane uphe ld the crucial non-responsibility criterion for
involuntary civil commitment by imposing a lack of control standard, but left open the constitutional meaning of lack of control.
Thus, we can expect that there will be much legislative and judicial
activity in the states about th e definition of lack of control and that
the Supreme Court will ultimately have to provide more precise
guidance. Crane's vague definition of lack of control and its recognition that the states retain considerable leeway to define mental
abnormality, and, presumably, also to define lack of control, imply
that most state definitions will be constitutionally acceptable. For
example, as this E ssay will argue,~o the definition of mental abnorm ality that the Court approve d in Hendricks is virtually incoherent
as a definition of "abnormality," yet H endricks accepted it without
comment. The majority's reference to the nature of the alleged
predator's diagnosis and to the severity of the disorder as facto rs
that would bear on lack of control-the only two variables the

"' I d. at 876.
'' !d.
'' Id.
'" Id. It is easy to agree with Ju stice Sca li a th a t s uch terms are vague and unhelpful.
but th ey arc preci sel y th e types o f mod ifi ers use d gener ally in civil commitment
s ta tut es to describe th e lik e lih ood of future dange rou s condu ct require d t'or
commitment. I ass um e that Just ice Sca li a wo uld di stinguish the validity o f s uch terms
to describe an amount of contro l capac it y from their use to describe a cl ea rl y
stat isti ca l sta nda rd, s uch as th e risk of future vio le n ce within a given tim e period.
'" See infra no tes 77- 82 a nd accompan ying text.
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Court menti o ne d-offers little specific direc tio n. Consequ ently,
th e Court is like ly to defer to a lm ost any state definition. Ind e ed, if
a state explicitl y d efined the causa l link to e mb race cont rol problem s. the caus a l link sta nd a rd v;~oulcl probably be acceptable,
notw ithstanding Cmne's requirem e nt for a n indep e nd en t lack of
1
con tro l cr it c rion .'
T his Essay will argue that neith e r th e control standard as usu ally
und erstood nor the stand8rcl of 8 ca usa l link be twee n me ntal Clbnorma li ty a nd se xu a l vi olen ce is th e ap prop ri a te. limitin g non12
respo nsibi lit y criterion . Substantive due process req uires a m ore
conceptua ll y defe nsible an d wo rkab le lim it in g standard to justify
the ma ss ive deprivation o f liberty th8t ind efinite in vo luntary civil
com mitment imposes. A lthough the Essay will propose a re interpre tati on of the control criterion, nothing the Essay will suggest is
strictly inconsiste nt with H endricks, Cron e, a nd ot her S upre me
Cour t cases.
P art I of the Essay will explain why non-respo nsibility is a necessary predicate for justifiable civil commitm ent and will d escribe the
role m ental disorder plays. It de monstrates ge nera lly that nonresponsibility is not e ntailed e ither by a causal link between mental
abnormality and further behavior or by the accurate predictability
of future behavior. Causation-even causation by an abnormal
variable-and predictability are not proxies for non-responsibility.
P art II will examine the causal link standard as it has bee n and
may in the future be applied specificall y to sexual predator commi tments. A lthough Crane seems to rej ect a pure causal link
criterion, I believe th at the causal link mi ght none the less be constitutionally permissible as a proxy fo r loss of con trol. For exampl e,
suppose the state defin es the loss of control criterion for commitIi1 ent as " any propensity for sexu al violence that is ca us ed by a
mental abn orm ality or personality disorder." Alt ho ugh this might
appear to be a patently impe rmissibl e attempt to avoid the strictures of Crane , nothing in the reasoning of Hendricks or Crane
would bar this cri teri on if a legislature or court explicitly fo und th at

"'See infra text acco mp anyin g notes 42-44.
"' A lt ho ugh th e Essay is motiva te d b y th e contro l issue th a t Hendricks and Cran e
raise , an cl mu ch of the di sc ussion is the refo re fo cused on se xual cond uct , th e anal ysis
of co nt rol proble ms is fu ll y ge nerali za bl e to a ll a ll ege d co ntro l prob le ms . s uch as
th ose st e mm in g from addiction s o r fr om me nta l d isord e rs ge ne rall y.
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the caus al link embraced suffici e nt lack of controL Afte r aiL the
Court concedes that psychiatry is an ever-advancing but still inexact science and that the states have considerable leeway to d efin e
the commitme nt criterion. A nd there is certainly intuitive logic to
suppo rt th e co nclusion that the causal li nk necessa ri ly im p iies serio us loss of co ntrol. This would be espe cial ly true if the linki ng
dbno rm a lit y were itse lf se riou s. as it virtuall y a lways will be.
!v[o rcove r, t\vo Just ices, Justice Scali ~1 a nd Just ice T ho mas , be li e ve
that the p ure causal link necessa ril y does ··e mbrace" a loss o f co ntrol. T hus. the causal link standard mu st be addresse d.
l conclude that, in ge neraL this stand ard, even \vhen it re lie s on a
recogn ized mental disorder , is vastly over-inclusive as a nonrespo nsibility standard, and , properly understo od , it is not a nonresponsibility stand ard at all. The Cran e majority correctly rejected
the pure causa l link standard, and future judicial decisions should
continue to reject it, even if there is an e xplicit recognition that it
allegedly embraces lack of co ntrol. Moreover, the Kansas criterion
of "mental abnormality" is obscure , circular, mostly incoherent,
and cannot adequately guide either legal decisionmakers or expert
witnesses upon whom decisionmakers rely so heavily. Causal link
stand ards in general and Kansas's criterion in particular cannot app ropriately limit the scope of sexual predator commitments. They
also pose a general threat to civil liberty .
Part III will consider the loss of control criterion for nonrespo nsibility. In principle , this is a non-re sponsibility criterion that
is independent of both m ental abnormality and of a causal link between mental abnormality and lega lly relevant behavior. Thus, a
serious loss of control standard hypothetically could be used to
limit the class of potentially sexually violent people who may be involuntarily civilly confined. ~-~ I argue, howeve r, that the standard is
conceptually unclear , scie ntifically and clinically unverifiable, and
practically unwork able . Consequently, courts and legislatures
sho uld reject a loss of control standard, as it is often used in common parlance.
T he last Part of the Essay will suggest and defend an irrationality
standard for sexual predator commitments and analogous types of
0

'

'' See infra note s 66-68 and accompan ying tex t.
""See, e.g., Kansas v. Cran e , 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
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confinemen t. Lack or capacity for rationality is bot h the quintesse ntial mental abnormality and the most central and coherent nonrespo nsibility standard that bo th the law a nd ordin a ry mo ra lity
e mplo y. F urtherm ore, thi s common sense standard can be fairiy
and work8.b ly app lied to id entify those agents wh o are gen uine ly
no t respo nsi ble. L ac k of capacity for rationality is a ge nuin e and
limiting non-respon sibilit y stand ard that wou ld meet substanti ve
due process require me nts for the justifica ti o n of in vo lunt ary civil
commitment of sexua l predators. More over, peopl e with substantial ra tionality defect s will a lso typically come within th e class of
peop le who, in comm on parla nce, cannot control th emselves. In all
ot her cases of sexual vi o lence, t he criminal justice sys tem is th e appropria te means to protect socie ty from dangero us people.

I. THE GENE RAL J USTIFICAT ION FOR C IVIL COMMITMENT: M ENTAL
ABNORMALITY AN D NON -RESPONSIBILIT Y

15

Involuntary civil commitment is justified in those cases in which
a mental abnormality predi sp oses a person to d angerous conduct
and the abnormality sufficiently compromises the person's rationality
and responsibility for such conduct. The reason for the conjunctive
criteria of predisposing causation and non-responsibility is crucial to
understanding the justification for involuntary civil commitment.
T he m aximal libert y our society accords to adults flows essentially
from the capacity for ratio nality that most adults possess.~ Our capacity for reason is the ground that supports autonomy and
freedom , including th e paradoxical freedom to be a potentially
dangero us agent. Th is is not only the dominant view in our jurisprudence, but it is also norm atively desirable. It trea ts most adults
as age nts and not just as creatures to be manipulated to achieve
6

"' I limit di scussion to co mmitme nts that are justifi ed by th e state's police power to
preve nt d ange ro us co ndu ct aga in st o th e rs beca use that is th e ground for co mmitting
menta ll y abnorma l sex ual preda tors. F urth e r, di scussion is limited to the re la ti on of
m en t al ab normality to dan ge ro us be havior and non-respo nsibi li ty . The Essay does
not discuss the constituti ona li ty o r a dvisabi lity of specific dange rousness stand ards
themse lves .
·"I recognize that this assert io n im plica tes many deep iss ues in politica l theory th at
thi s Essay ca nnot address and tha t th e capacity for reason is not the so le ground for
libe rty and a ut o nomy. Non e thel ess, I be lieve the assert ion is a n acc urat e positive
acco unt o f pre va iling no rms o f law and morality and is sufficie nt fo r the purpose o f
this E ssay.
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consequ e ntial e nds, such as social safety . It also respects pe rso nhood and hum an dignity. O ur ca pacity for reason expl ains why ou r
socie ty does not co nfine fo r dangero usness alon e but instead requires either th e commi ss io n of a crime o r non-responsibility.
The capaci ty fo r reason criterion does not mea n that an agent
must act rationally to be responsible . Afte r all, much human act ion
is irrational, arational, fooli sh, and e ven automatic or habit ua l.
No ne th e less, a guidin g ass um pt ion or law and m orali ty is tha t mos t
age nt s re tain th e capacity to be guided by rea so n and it is their
duty to exercise that cap acity whe n important interests are at
stake ."7 If they retai n th at ca pacity, t hey may be held re spon sible .
If age nts are not res ponsible, howeve r, because they are not capabl e of being guided by reason in a particular context, the n
special legal rul es that express and impose the consequ ences of
non-responsibility ap ply to them. Such legal rules include various
incompetencies, legal ins anity, and involuntary civil commitm ent.
We do not preventi vely confine even the most da ngerous agen ts
unle ss they have been convicted of a crime or are not responsible.
Involuntary civil commitment is morally and legally justifiable only
if a citizen subject to such commitment is not responsible for the
dange rous behavior that crea tes the need for confinement. T he
crucial question , then , is the relation of mental abnormality to nonresponsibility.
F irst, consider the case of a potentially violent person with a
mental abnormality that is unrelated to the agent 's violence potential. Such an agent is simply a potentially violent person who happens
to have a co-occurring mental abnormality. The abnormality is no
more relevant to the viol ence potential and to the agent's responsibility for potential violence than th e color of the person 's eyes .
Because we do no t preventively confine citizens on the ground of
dangerousness alone, there is no justification for committing such
people.
When mental abnormality is causally related to legally releva nt
behavior, such as violent, future conduct, two effects are possible:
"Cons id e r, for exa mple, which leg o ne puts thro ugh on e's und e rpants first. It is
ha rd to imagine be havi o r that is more a utomati c, more thoughtl ess, or more ha bitu a l.
No thing turns o n whi ch leg is first, howeve r. If se ri o us conseque nces we re to flow
from thi s choice , virtua lly a ll agen ts would re tain sufficient capacity for reaso n to
cause th e mse lves to pay a tt e ntion and to break th e life-long habit , if n ecessary.
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the abnormality may play a predisposin g ca usa l ro le, a nd th e abnormality may un de rmine the agen t's resp onsibili ty for the legally
relevant be havior. Consid e r first how a mental abno rm al ity ma y
ope rat e as a predisposing cause of behavior. A men tal abnormality
does not cause lega ll y re levant bodily movements to beco me me re
biophysical mech anism s, like th e je rk of an arm that an unco ntrolled neurological di sord er may prod uce . A bn o rm a l tho ughts,
des ires . perce pti ons . a nd the like are not simply irresi sti ble m echa nical causes of further cond uct. even iL ultimat ely. biophysical
exp lan ations can be given for them (and fo r norma l thoughts, desires, an d perceptio ns ). Rather, such abnormalities create irrati onal
reasons for acti on or compro mis e the age nt 's ge nera l capacity for
rationality. A m ental abnormality thu s some tim es piays a causal
role by affecting the agent's practical reasoning th at leads to th e legally relevant be havior. If such irrationality had not existed , the
legally relevant be havior would have been less like ly to occur. A
mental abnormality is not a necessary cause of legally relevant behavior-and it is virtually never sufficient-but it m ay be a strongly
predisposing cause .
Mental abnormality also sometimes plays a causal role by undermining the agent's capacity for self-control or by causing an
agent to "lose control. " Although this is a common form of usage , I
suggest in Part IV that this explanation of the causal role of m e ntal
disord er is confused or be tter expl ained in terms of rationality .
Ratio nality and irrationality are continuum concepts. In some
cases, causal abnormality may und e rmine the capacity for rationality sufficiently to warrant the further conclusion tha t the age nt was
also not responsible for th e behavior the abnormality caus e d.-~~
W hether th e agent was suffering fro m a mental abnormalitl<~ and

" For a di sc ussion of the criteri a for rationality. see infra notes 103~104 and
accompanyi ng text and infra text accompanyin g note 11 7.
"" This Essay does not enter highly tech ni cal phil os ophical a nd psych o logical
debates about the validity of a disorder or disease co nce ption of ment al abnormality.
It will simply ass ume that a so und defe nse of suc h a co nce pt ion ca n be provid ed and
that men tal abnormalities are e ntities that ex ist in nature a nd a re not simply social
constru ctio ns. Th is assumption is of course controve rsial. Sec Ian Hacking . The Social
Co nstru cti on of What? 10 0~04 (1999) (d iscussin g whet he r " me n tal di so rd e r" is a
b iologi ca l or a social constru ction). Sec ge nera lly A llan V. Horwitz, Creat ing Mental
Illness (2002) (providi ng a histo ry of th e modern deve lopment of th e conce pt of
mental di sord e r and a critique of much mod e rn diag nostic practice. ba sc:cl on social
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how much irration ality it produ ce d are factual qu es ti o ns , but de Ierrnini ng how much ra tion al cap aci ty one mu st lack to conclude
th<tl an age nt is n ot respo nsibl e is a normative qu est io n . T he de gree of irration ality required mi ght vary from con text to co nt ex t.
For exampl e , the amount of irrationa li ty that wo uld permi t a finding ol' in compe ten ce to co nt ract need no t be th e sa m e as the
~ t mo un t necessary to a vo id crimin a l li <1 hilit y. No net hel ess , it should
lx ciear that th e lack of capacit y for rat io nalit y necessa ry to sup port involuntary civil confin ement sh o uld be su bst a nti a l, e spe cia lly
if suc h confi n e ment is indefinite. ·wh ateve r irra tion a lit y standard is
app lied, howeve r , it is crucial to recog ni ze th at con cl usion s ab o ut
causat ion a nd non-responsibility are indepe nd e nt.
Co nsid e r, for exampl e, a case in wh ich mental abnor malit y pl ays
a cau sa lly predisp osing role in t he agent 's potential for vio lence .
Suppose th a t, as the res ult of a recogn ized m e ntal abnorm a lity, the
0
1
age nt is suspici o us,' has problems controll ing ange r and imp uls es ,"
or ha s detache d interpe rsonal relatio ns. "" Such c haracterist ics, especially if they are relatively extreme , may ind eed predispose a
person to act violently by making it harde r for the age nt to bring
reason to bear. Why , however, should th ose characteristics also entail th a t th e agent is not responsible if the agen t d oes act vio lently?
People with such characteristics, like sex ual pred a tors, will seldo m
succee d with an insanity defense. Although th ese signs and symptoms o f m e ntal abnormality m ay co mpromi se the cap aci ty for
ra tion ality, as do normal conditi o ns such as stress or fatigu e, they
virtually ne ver do so suffi ciently to undermin e responsibility.
cons tru ct ivist acco unts). Non e theless, th e ass ump ti on that ment a l di so rders are va lid
e ntities is the d om in a nt view wit hin th e me n ta l hea lth pro fessio ns. A lth o ug h
legislat o rs and judges m ay be aware of problem s with th e co ncep tu a l, scien tific , and
cl inical un ders tand ing of menta l diso rd ers , they a re unlike ly to reject th e do min a nt
V I e W.

so Susp icious ness is a sy mptom o f both pa ranoid pe rsona lity disorder a nd
sc hizot ypal personali ty disorder. See Am. Psychiat ri c Ass'n, Di ag nosti c and Stati stica l
Ma nu al of Menta l Di sorders 694, 701 (4th eel. & Text R e vision 2000) [h e rein a ft e r
DSM- IV-TR]. Whe ther there is an unde rl ying disorder in de pend e nt o f the sy m pto m
o r whether th e di so rder is constitut ed by the sym ptom is ofte n a fra ugh t qu es tion. See
infra tex t acco mpanying note 66. I simpl y accept the dominant view th a t th e re must
be som e type o f un de rlyin g abn o rmality.
' ' An ge r a nd impulse contro l pro bl e ms a re sympto ms o f bord e rline pe rsona li ty
di so rd e r. D SM -IV-T R, supra note 50, at 710.
s~ D e tac hed inte rpe rso na l re lations a re a sy mptom o r sc hi zoid pe rsonality disord e r.
l ei . at 697 .
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\V heth er a p re disposing fac tor is produced by a m en ta l di so rd e r
or by some oth e r '·normal " or "a bno rmal " cause mak es n o d ifference to whe th e r th e age nt is respo nsible. A ca use is just a cause,
and ca usation per se is no t an excu se , whe ther th e ca usat ion is
.. normal " or '· ab no rma l. " If ca usa ti o n we re an exc use , no one
\vouid be res po ns ibl e for any con d uct , becau se all beh avior is
caused by m ultip le va ri ab les not within the age nt' s contro l. '; A
gen ui ne no n- respo nsib ility con d ition , such as suffici e nt iack of rati ona l capac ity. mu st a lso be present. If it were not. co n fin e men t
woul d be j us tifi c c! by d an gerousness alone. A predi sposing me nt a l
di sorder wo uld th en be nothin g more than a ca use . li ke an y oth e r
po te ntia l ca use , tha t he lps us to predict d ange rousness .
Ma ny people with se vere mental disorders tha t p redis p ose th em
to legall y re le va n t co nduct are responsible for the ir conduct be cause th ey retain sufficient capacity for rati onali ty to be considere d
com peten t or blameworth y. F or example , it is a co mmonpl ace in
criminal law th at m any defendants suffering from ment al disord ers
th at predispose th em to crime are consid ered sufficie ntly ra ti o na l
to be held resp onsibl e and are punished. Hendri cks and C r ane are
exa mples of defendants with predisposing mental disord e rs who
were con victed and punished for their conduct. Co nduct that is
properl y considere d a sign or symptom of an underlying di sorder is
none theless human action, and no conclusio n a bout nonresponsibi lity is e nt ailed. We cannot simply infer non- resp o nsibili ty
without begging the qu es ti on of what should co unt as an e xcusin g
condition .'.\ In dee d , the Am erican Psychiatric A ssoci at io n exp licit ly
warns that psychiatric di agnoses and crite ria entail n o lega l conclusions about responsibility or even about wheth er an agent mee ts
lega l crite ri a for th e presence of a mental disorde r. 55 T he menta l
abnorm ality must al so compromise the agent's ration ality because
deficient capacity for ratio nality is the ge nuin e condit ion for no nresponsibility.

' 'M icha el S. Mo ore. Ca usa ti on a nd the Excuses, 73 Ca l. L. Rev. 1091 , 111 2-] 4
(1 985) : Step he n J. Morse , Culp ab ility and Con trol, 142 U . Pa. L. R e v. 1587, 1592- 94
(1 994) .
'' He rbe rt Fingare tte & A nne Fingare tt e H asse, Me ntal Di sa bili ties and C rimi nal
Respons ibility 55-65 (1979).
'' DSM-I V-TR. supra note 50, a t xxxii- xxxiii , xx xvii.
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Con sider th e a nalo gy of the insanity defense. The crite ria for th e
dominant, ''cognitive" insanity defense tests include a mental abnorm ality that causes a furth e r, necessary defect in r a tionality. F or
ex am ple , the lvf'Naglzterz test requires that the men ta l abn orm a lit y
ca use the person not to know the nature and qual ity of th e act or
no t to know t hat it was wro ng. '" The cognitive crite ri a o f th e
A mer ican Law Institut e's Mo del Pe na l Code test re quire me nta l
abnorm a lity to produce a lac k of su bstantial capacity to appreciate
7
the cri m inali ty or wrongfuln ess o f o ne's act.' A ga in , conclusions
about irration ality caused by abnormality and about resp o nsibi lity
are re late d but indepe ndent from on e another. A causa l re latio n
be twee n abnorm alit y and other behavior does no t e ntail th a t th e
agent is not responsibl e for the other behavior. Th e prese nce o f a
causal link is an over-inclusive indicator of non-responsibility .''
A lthough our socie ty mi ght be considerably safer if we we re
willing to confine predictably dangerous agents, predictability is
also not per se a criterion of non-responsibility. We are incontrove rtibl y respon sible for much behavior that is entirely predicta ble .
Succe ssful human interaction would be impossible if this were not
true. F urthermore, understanding the causes of behavior may enhance the predictability of that behavior, but this does not
necessarily undermine responsibility. For example, there is a strong
correlation in our society between poverty and certain forms of
crime , and many people think that poverty is a cause of such criminal conduct. Poverty is thus a risk factor and increases the
predicti ve likelihood that a poor person will commit some types of
crime . It would be illogical and disrespectful, however, to claim

'" M'Naghten 's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200,210 (H.L. 1843) (Eng.).
'' Mode l Pe nal Co d e~ 4.01 (1) (1962) .
" Failure to recognize the over-in clusi ve ness of a simple ca usal rel a ti o n as a
criterion for non-responsibility was th e fatal fl aw in th e infamous "product '' rule fo r
legal in san ity ado pted by the Unite d S tat es Co urt of Appeal s fo r th e Di strict o f
Columbi a. Durh am v. U nit ed States, 214 F 2cl 862, 874- 75 (D.C. C ir. 1954) (adoptin g
th e rul e th a t the defe ndant is e xcuse d if the unl awful act was th e " product' ' o f menta l
di sease o r defect) , overrul ed by Unit ed States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969. 989-95 (D. C.
C ir. 1972) (ad o pting compo ne nts o f th e Mode l Penal Code s tandard). All in sanity
de fe nse tri als in fede ral co urts are no w go ve rn ed by the test Con g ress ado pted in
1984.1 8 U .S.C. ~ l7(a) (2002) (adoptin g a cognitive test a nd requiring the prese nce of
a "se ve re ·· me nt al di se ase or defect).
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that poverty per se renders poor criminals non-responsible. Poverty is just a cause, albeit a cause that enhances predictability.
Whether mental disorder or any other ''normal" or "abnormal"
cause enhances the predictability of any behavior does not mean
that the agent is less responsible for the behavior. Predictability per
se , whether or not enhanced by causal understanding, does not undermine responsibility.''"
Civil commitment is a massive intrusion on liberty that can be
justified only by limiting it to cases in which an agent is genuinely
not responsible for legally relevant conduct, such as violent behavior. Causation, wh ether by normal or abnormal causes, and
predictability are not per se proper non-responsibility criteria. This
Essay therefore turns to alternatives.

II.

THE CAUSAL LINK STANDARD

Kansas argued in Crane, and the dissent agreed, that a causally
predisposing link between mental abnormality and sexual violence
should be a constitutionally acceptable limiting criterion for the involuntary civil confinement of sexual predators. 61 The preceding
Part argued generally that causal link standards are poor proxies
for non-responsibility. This Part specifically considers and rejects
the validity of causal link standards for non-responsibility.
Causal link standards appear facially plausible, especially if they
are coupled with a recognition that the link embraces a control
problem. After all, if mental abnormality-by definition a behavioral defect-predisposes an agent to engage in sexually violent
'''Some have argued that poverty or deprivation is per se an excusing factor, but
such arguments confuse causation with excuse and are ultimately unpersuasive. See
Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in From Social JL'sticc to Criminal Justice:
Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Law 114, 140--54 (William Heffernan &
John Kleinig eels., 2000) (reviewing and rejecting the various arguments for why
poverty or deprivation per se should excuse).
"'As noted previously, desires for social safety might justify pure preventive
detention, if predictive accuracy were sufficiently great, but preventive detention
would be pure because predictability does not per se undermine responsibility. See
supra note 4.
1
' Crane, 122 S. Ct. at 875-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also In re Leon G, 26 P.3d
481 (Ariz. 2001), in which the Arizona Supreme Court held, contrary to the Kansas
Supreme Court's decision in Crane, that an independent control defect is not required
by substantive clue process as a predicate for involuntary civil commitment of sexual
predators and that the causal link standard is constitutionally acceptable.
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co nduct, the abnorm a lity must und e rmin e co ntrol ca pacity e ithe r
d irectly or indirectly by comp ro mising ration a lity. No nethe less, this
Part argues th at, even if th e required predi ca te abn orm ality is a
recog nize d, arguabl y seve re di so rde r. as Just ice Breye r 's H endrick s
di ssent s u g geste d ,~>" the causal link is vas tly ove r-inclu si ve as a gene ra l cri terion for th e n ecessa ry no n-res ponsibilit y co nditi o n th at
justifi es preve nti ve civil confin em e nt. Mo reover, ne ith e r H en dricks
nor Cron e specificall y re quired that the me nta l abn ormalit y had to
be a seve re, recognized men ta l d iso rder. Co nse qu e nt ly, th e type of
me nta l a bnormality cri te rion ado pted by Ka nsas a nd oth e r states,
which the Court acce pted, is no t onl y o ver-inclusive; it al so places
essenti all y no non-responsibili ty limi t on commitm ent. Th e criterio n is so broad that it applies to any pe rso n who co mmits sexual
violence, and, m ore ge nerally , it appli es to all be havi or, norm al and
a bnorm al alike. It is no t a definition of a bn orm a lity a t all.
As P art I demonstrated , a caus all y predisposing link be twe en
me ntal abnorm ality and legall y relev ant behavior is n either a necess ary nor sufficient non-responsibility crite rion."3 In particular,
identifying a cause for behavio r, including an abnormal cause, does
not m ea n that the agent canno t contro l the behavio r. Causation is
no t per se an excusing conditi on; causa tion is not th e opposite of
control ; the causal link between abn ormality and conduct is not
m e chanistically inexorable; and it is simply not th e case that all
conduct causally influe nced b y mental abnormality also indicates a
suffici ent defect in rationality to warrant the conclusion that th e
4
agent was not responsible." T he causa l lin k simply describes the
ca us a ti on of action. Although all acti ons are caused , not all actions
are generated by lack of contro l capacity or by substantial r ationalit y defects. A s Part I also dem onstr ated , predictability, eve n when
enhanced by causal understanding, is also n o t a non-respo nsibility
conditi on per se . Even if be havior ca used by an abnorm ality is
more predictabl e than the sam e be havior caused "norm ally, " it
does not foll ow that a bnorma l causa tion is a non-responsibility
conditi on. Moreover, demographic and beh avioral variables, espe-

Kan sas v. H e ndri cks , 521 U.S. 346,375-76 (1 997 ) (Breye r, J. di sse nting) .
See supra Part I.
"' Ind eed , ca usa l me nta l ab norma lity ca n pa radox ica ll y in crease ra ti o na li ty . Fo r
exa mpl e, mild bu t di agnosab le ma ni c sta tes m ight heighte n an age nt 's cla rity o f
tho ugh t and percep tu a l powe rs.
"2
6

·'
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ciall y past history, are far more likely to be valid pred icto rs than
purely clinical or psychopathological variables ."'
T here is also a conceptua l problem with th e stand ard p icture of
the causal link, which is that an " underlying" disorder causes the
al leged ly '·sympt omati c'' le ga lly relevant be havior. In th e case of
many disorde rs po tentially linked to sexual violen ce. the causa l
link is ta utol ogicall y automatic. T he necessary and sufficie nt crite ria for the disorder are precise ly the behaviors that are su pposed ly
caused. and there is no evide nce of an independent "underlying"
d iso rder. For examp le , if an agent has a sufficientl y strong des ire
for .. abnormal'' sex obj ects"" or other "abnormal" sexual be hav ior
and causes ha rm by act in g on it, the agent will be dee med to be suffer ing fro m a recognized and severe sexual di sorder,"' but th ere is
no un derly ing d iso rder separate from the desire and co nd uct itself.
To tak e another example , if an agent has a history of man y signs of
irrespo nsible a nd anti social conduct, this will be sufficient to warrant the recognized diagnosis of "Antisocial Personality Disorder. " 6'
O nce again , however, there is no disorder distinct from th e be havior th at causes the behavior. I am not denying that there may be
" underlying" biological, psychological, and sociological causes for
such behavior. Ind eed, there are such underlying causes for all behavior. I am sugges ting that there is reason to believe that for many
personality disorders and the other types of be havi oral abnormalities sexual predators present, there may not be any id entifi able ,
underlying, biological or functional abnormality that would ge ner''' Jam es Bont a e t a!., The Predictio n of Crimin a l a nd Violent Recidi vism Amo ng
Men tall y Di sord er ed Offe nd ers: A M e ta-Analysis , 123 Psyc ho!. Bull. 123. 139 (1 998 ).
"" I p lace the te rm "a bnorm al" in scare quotes be cause at present th e re is no
ade quate, uncontroversia l th eo ry of the normality or abno rmalit y o f d es ires. R o bert
Nozick. The Nature of Ratio na lity 139-40 (1993) ("A t prese nt , we have no ad eq uate
th eo ry o f the s ubstanti ve rati o na lity of goa ls and desires .... '') . Psychiat ry and
psychol ogy arc not except ion s. Recall that, as rece ntly as th e early 1970s . psychiatric
o rthodoxy held that a sexual prefe re nce for a n adult membe r of o ne's own sex was a
sy mptom of a psych ia tric d isord er. See Am. Psychiatric A ss 'n , Di agnost ic a nd
Statistica l Manua l o f Me ntal Disord e rs 44 (2d eel. 1968). In 1973, th e Asso cia tion
vored to ex clud e ho mosex ua lity per se as a recognized di so rd e r. T he re ha d been no
sc ie ntifi c o r clinical adva nces that s upporte d the change, howeve r. Wh a t changed
we re th e va lu es of the maj ority of psychiatrists. See Stephe n J. M o rse . C razy
Be havior. Mora ls & Sc ie nce: An Ana lysis of Menta l H ea lth Law , 51 S. Ca l. L. Re v.
527, 557- 58 (1 978) .
7
" DS tvl-IV-TR. s upra note 50. a t 535.566- 76.
"' lei. at 701-06.
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ate the conc lusion t hat the beha vior is clinically abno rm al rath er
than socially deviant, immoral or the lik e. Fin ally , even if the re
were --unde rl yi ng" ca uses that sat isfied a plausible definition of
psychi atri c or psychological abnormalit y, it would no t mean that
the conduct sho ul d be excused. A ll patterns of desire and conduct
are caused by some t hing, an abnormal cause is also just a cause .
and ccwsation does not per se en tail non-responsibility .
Consider th e app licatio n of the foregoin g concep tua l fea ture of
som e psych iatric diagnoses to the case of menta ll y abnormal se xua l
Predat io n. If a n agent stromdv desires and has a historv of sexucll
predation, the causal link is established by definition be cause the
predator is mentally abnorm al by virtue of being a pred ator . The
predisposing ca use , sexua l desire, and the lega lly re levant sexuall y
violent co ndu ct that sat isfies the dangero usn ess criterion together
als o satisfy t he requirements of abnorm ality and a causal link . Not
all predators who satisfy the causal link standard shoul d be committed because m any are responsible , but if the causal link
standard is the criterion for commitment, it will always be demonstrable. A ll sexual predation dangerous enough to justify the
dangerousness criterion for preventive confinement will als o warrant a diagnosis. Evaluators and trial courts could claim that not all
predators who meet the causal link standard are committable even
though all suffer from a serious abnormality, but on what legally
justifiabl e grounds could they reach such a conclusion if the ca usal
link is the standard ? A ll sexually dangerous agents could be fo und
to have a serious control problem. By necessity, decisionmakers
would be imposing their own private , subj ective criteria, based, one
assumes, on considerations of danger and perhaps non-responsibility,
but such decisionmaking would be legally arbitrary and unacce ptable . Limiting the causal link standard by requirin g t hat the
pred ator suffer from a recognized predisposing mental d isorder
will not sol ve the circularity prob lem.
Furthermore , most of the recognized disorders that will apply in
cases of sexual predation are not promising candidates as predicates for non-responsibility. T he recognized disorders that are
likely to support a fi nding of the causal link-such as the
parapbilias, impulse disorders generally, and personality disorders-are precisely those that raise the circularity pro blem most
acutely. They do so because they are marked primarily by abnor~

~

~
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malities of desire , conduct, and pe rvas ive behav ioral or affe ctive
"style,"w rather than by re latively discrete , severe abn ormaliti es of
cognition, perception. a nd affect. ''' In these cases, both the co nclusion conce rning ab norm ality and the inclusion of th e co ndu ct as
the criteri a for a recogni ze d dis orde r will inevit ab ly be affect ed by
conside rat ions of social co nt ext and val ues in additi on to m o re
neut ral, scientifi c, and clini ca l criteria fo r abnorma lity, such as sig71
nifica nt dysfuncti o n or cl istress. In short, it is simply hard e r to
characterize conduct and persona lity disorders as "diseases," eve n
if the conduct is re latively extreme and har mful. '~
"Person a lity di so rder" is a recogn ized category of psychiatric cliagn oses,n but people with perso nalit y disorders rare ly suffer on
that basis a lone fr om th e types of psychotic cognition or e xtre m ely
severe m ood problems th at are th e standard tou chston es for a finding of non-responsibility. Most are perfectly in touch with rea lity,
their instrumental rati on ality is intact, and they have adequate
knowledge of th e applicable m oral and legal rules that apply to
the ir conduct.'.] Although their abnormalities might m ake it h a rder
,. For example, Th e Diagnostic a nd S tat istical Manual of Men tal Di sord e rs defi nes a
perso nality di sorder generica ll y as '· an e nduring pa ttern of inner experience a nd
be havior that deviates markedly from th e ex pect at io ns of the individual's culture . is
pervasive and inflexi ble, has an onse t in ado lescence o r ea rl y ad ulth ood , is stab le ove r
time , a nd leads to dist ress or impairm e nt. " DSM-lV-TR, supra note 50, a t 685.
'" As the text suggests. most sex ually viole nt agents a re not motivated by psychotic
re aso ns. Furthe rmore, sex ual preda tor comm itments will be unnece ssary for sex ually
vio le nt agents who are grossl y o ut of contact with rea lity beca use th ey wi ll be lega ll y
in sa ne a nd com mitt able o n th at basis. See in fra text acco mpany in g note 8 1.
71
See DSl\11-IV-TR, supra note 50, at xxx- xxxi (st a ting a generic definition of mental
abnor mality).
n As m y clinical teachers taug ht me. most me ntal disord e rs a re things th at people
" have ," but pe rsonality disorders a re wha t people " a re. " Al th o ugh imprecise, this
fo rmulation he lps on e underst and why cha racterizing some of the latte r as disorders
or diseases is difficult.
" DSl\11-IV-TR, supra note 50. a t 685 .
" In many cases , th e cond uct that is th e basis for the diagnosis docs not per se ca use
th e pe rson distress. For exampl e, an agent who se con duct warrants the diagnosis of
Antisocial P erso nality Disorde r may be dis tressed by the reaction s of the police,
creditors, and o thers, bu t the cond uct it se lf mi ght no t be distressin g. Similarl y, many
sexually viole nt predators are no t distressed by th eir desire s, b ut th ey are di st resse d
by the cond emnation a nd puni shment socie ty and the law impose . Moreover, the
degree of distress or impairment such diso rde rs ca use is very much a function of th e
particular social, moral , and lega l regime in which th e perso n li ves, whi ch once aga in
suggests th e highly valu e-relative nature of the jud gment of disord er in the se cases.
See , e .g., Ell e n Barry, Despit e The ra pies, Ped oph ili a Elud es Cure , Bos ton G lobe,
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for them to behave well , they seldom m anifest the grave probl e ms
that might satisfy an insanity defen se or e ven warra nt a commo nse nse excuse on th e ground th a t the person cannot "help" him se lf
or herse lf. Even if the term " personality di sorde r" we re interpre ted
broadly to in clude paraphilias, di so rders of impul se controL or
o th e r recogni ze d disord e rs th a t mi ght a pply to sexual predat ors,
th e term wo uld still be ove r-inclu sive as a predi cate for no nres pon sibility in the case of mos t sex uall y viol e nt people.
The causal link standard's ge neral ove r-inclusiven ess as a nonres ponsibility criterion and its circul arity probl e ms are especially
problematic in the criteria for commitment that Kan sas and other
states have adopted. 7' R ecall th e basic definition of a mentally abnormal sexual predator: "any person who has been convicted of or
charged with a sexually violent offe nse and who suffers from a
me ntal abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence. " 7" A " mental
abnormality" is defined as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the
person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting
such person a menace to the health and safety of others." 77 This basic definition requires one of two types of abnormality-personality
disorder or mental abnormality, as Kansas defines this term-to
satisfy the critical non-responsibility justification for involuntary
confinement. Unless these abnormalities produce or are the
equivalent of non-responsibility, the causal link between abnormality and predation does no legal justificatory work, and the
definition simply describes an agent who is " caused to be " dangerous. After all, every dangerous agent is caused to be dangerous by
some set of causal variables, and "caused" dangerousness alone is
insufficient to justify involuntary commitment. Just because behavior is caused does not m ean that it cannot be controlled. T hus , the
F eb . 14, 2002 , at A1 (reporting that one therapi st, fru st rated by the inability to change
th e motiva tion o f pedo philes, recomm e nd ed that som e sho uld move to soci e ti es
wh e re soci al and legal constraints on no n-coe rcive pedophilic practices are less se ve re
th a n in our soci e ty); see also supra not e 66 (di sc ussin g hom osexuality).
75 The Ka nsas criteria are id e ntical o r similar to those in oth e r sexu al pred ator
commitm e nt statutes. See, e.g. , Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §~ 71.09.020(1), (2) , (4) , (12)
(West 2002) . The analysis herein of the Kan sas crite ria exte nds a previous treatme nt.
Mo rse, Fea r of D a nger , Flight from Culpa bilit y, supra note 5, a t 260- 61.
" Kan. Stat. Ann . § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2000) .
77
Id. ~ 59-29a02(b) .
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terms "personality disorder" and " menta l abnormali ty" mu st be
th e ground for non -re sponsibility, in addition to being part of the
necessarv causal link.
We have already seen that personality di sorder is an overin clusive criterion fo r non-resp ons ibility and is not a prom ising
predicate for non-res ponsibility in any case . Therefore, let us turn
to conside rat ion of Kansas's id iosyncratic non-responsi bi li ty crite ri on, .. mental abn ormality. " The term " mental a bnorm ality" ' is not
7
a recognized diagnostic term , but, as we ha ve see n. ' the Supreme
Court in He ndricks properly noted that states are free to define lega l criteria as th ey wi sh, and the crit er i~:1 for sexu al predator
commitme nts are surely legal. States consequen tly need no t be
bou nd by the criteria employed by extra-legal groups, suc h as psychi a trists and psychologists. T he only question is whether the
criteria adopted are rationally calculated to achi eve a justifi able
purpose. In this case, the justifiable purpose is to ide ntify those
dangerous sexual offenders who are not responsible. But "mental
abnormality," as Kansas defines it, could not poss ibl y sa tisfy this
goal because it would apply to every person who is potentially
sexually violent, whether or not the person's conduct warranted a
recognized diagnosis. The " mental abnormality" criterion is obscure , circular, and mostly incoherent.
The definition states that a person is abnormal if any genetically
inherited/pre natally acquired (congenital) or e nvironm ental ( acquired thro ugh life experience) variabl e that affe cts the person's
emotional or volitional ability predisposes the person to engage in
criminal sex ual misconduct. It is not clear what is meant by "emotional " or "volitional" ability. Neither word is a term o f art or a
technical term in the behavioral or philosophical literature. T he
former has a common sense, intuitive m ea ning, but the concept of
79
volition is extraordinarily vexed. If it refers to the ab ility of an
agent to execute his or her intention, predators have no volitional
0

'" Sec sup ra text accompa nying note 12.
7
'' The mea ning of volition is controversial in
philosophy and psychology. See
Mich ae l S. Moore, Act a nd Crime : The Plulosophy of Au ion and Irs l mplicarions fo r
Criminal L aw 113-65 (1993) (pro viding th e most ex te nsive discuss io n o r vo liti o n in
th e legal literat ure , criticizing th e view that volitions are desires, and a rguing that a
vo litio n is an intention to execute a basic ac tion).
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disability whatsoe ver.''!} If it refe rs to states of desiring o r wan ting, it
is red un da nt with the re quirem ent of a "predispositi on " to cri mi1nl
se xual vio le nce .
F urth e rmore , predisposing cognitive variables are evid e ntl y ex c lu clcd fro m Ka nsas 's definition , probably because cogn itive
oro blems :1rc rare lv fac tors in abnormalities of desi re . Jf thcv \ve rc .
as in the case of manife st delusi o ns, stand ard no n-responsibil ity
cond ition s. suc h as gross ir rati onality, wo uld obtain. For example ,
J us tice Sc<t lia ·s Crone dissent raises the hyp ot heti ca l case o f a man
wi th <t will of stee l who de lusionall y belie ves th at every woman he
e nc ou nt ers is inviting crude sexual advan ces.s1 Such an agen t wo ul d
pro bably meet eve n a narrow, cognitive criterion fo r legal ins an it y.
In a fund amen tal sense, th e age nt does not know wh at he is d oin g
o r docs not know that what be is do ing is wrong because he de lusion a lly believes that his crude advances are justi fied by th e
woman 's consent. T his defendant could be indefi nite ly committed
using traditional and relatively uncontrove rsial post-insanity acquittal commitment. Although gross cognitive impairments tend to
be clearly ide ntifiable and might render agents dangero us a nd no nresponsible , their exclusion from the m ental abnormality definition
in the sexual predator criteria does not present a practical problem.
Holding aside , then , both a clear understanding of what the statute means by emotional and volitional abiliti es and any
consideration of cognitive abilities, what else would pred ispose any
agent to any conduct-sexual or otherwise, normal or a bnormalif no t biological and environmental variables that affect t he agent 's
emotional and volitional ability? In other words, the definition is
simply a partial, generic description of the causation of a ll b e havior, and it is not a limiting definition of abnormality. A ll b e havior is
(partially) caused by emotional and volitional a bilitie s that have
them selves been caused by congenital and acquired characteristics .
T h e condition that makes sexual predation mentall y abnorm alcongenital or acquired causes of a predispositio n-a pplies to all
be havior and is, thus , vacuous. It certainly cannot explain why the
inevitable presence of congenital and acquired causes of a p redisposition me ans that the age nt cannot control and is n o t responsible
1

..1

"' See Finga re tt e & H asse , supra no te 54. at 61.
" Ka ns<lS v. Crane, 122 S. C t. 867,875 (2002) (Scali a . J .. dissenting).
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for action that expresses th e predisposition. Indeed, acco rdin g to
this criterion, no one would eve r be responsible for a ny conduct.
T he Kansas criterion is en ti re ly dep e nde nt on th e req uiremen t
of a specific predisposition to co mmit sexua ll y violent offenses to
limit the definition to sex u;:d pre dators , but it is not a de finiti on of
mental abnormalit y eve n in the case of se xually violent peopl e . If
any age nt who has a predisposition to com mit sex ua l offen ses is
mentally abnor mal , as th e d e finition impli es , then the de fini tion or
me nt al a bnormality is ci rcular, an d abnor mality do es not in dependently provid e eve n part of th e necessary causal link . The
definition presupposes what it is trying to explain. t-,.1Ioreover, such
a circular definition collapses the cliched but important distinction
between " badness" a nd ·· m ad ness," whi ch is precise ly th e di stin cti on the definition is m ea nt to achi eve to justify civil rath er than
criminal commitment.
The criterion suffe rs from further defects. It is strange to define
a mental abnorma lit y by reference to the penal code. Such a reference suggests that legislative expansion or contraction of the scope
of criminalization of sexual offenses would inherently expand or
contract the scope of what counts as me ntally abnormal and what
automatically satisfies the causal link. The definition also requires
that the predisposition to sexu al violence must " men ace" others to
a sufficient degree. This re quirement implies that some sexually
violent offe nses might not constitute a menace to the health and
safety of o thers. ~c But if so, why are such offenses criminalized?
F urth ermore, the degree of menace require d , like the definition of
a sexual offense, is a normative moral and legal standard. In what
way is a normative legal stand ard of dan gerousness a rational part
of the definition of mental abnormality rather than the product of
such abnormality?
In sum, the criteria in the Kansas statute that es tablish nonresponsibility, perso nality disorder, and mental abnormality, are
" In a pe rsona l com mu ni ca tion. Sh e rr y Colb points o ut th a t th e ''d egree of m e nace"
may re fe r to the stati stica l likelihood that the predat o r wi ll act rather than to th e ha rm
the conduct will produ ce . The statutory lang ua ge is ambig uous, but I think the latte r
is th e more natural readi ng. Even if it does refer to statistical risk, the amount of risk
required is a normative, lega l issu e . El e ctro nic Corre sponden ce from Sherry Colb ,
Professor of Law, Ru tge rs School of La w at Newark , to Steph en J. Mo rse , Professor
of Law, Unive rsit y o f Pe nnsylvan ia (D ec. 22. 2001) (o n file with th e V irg ini a Law
Review Asso ciat ion ).
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vast ly ove r-inclu sive non-responsibilit y or co ntrol criteria, and the
definition of mental ab norm ality is both obscure and virtually incohere nt. Th e causal link sta nda rd in ge ne ral a nd th e Kansas
cr iteria in particular are no t non -responsibility sta ndards. Th ey
cannot conceivably limit involunt a ry civil commitment only to
those potential predators who ca nn ot control th e mselves a nd are,
thus, not responsibl e for their potenti al sexua l viole nce. Us ing such
criteri a, virtually every predato r wo uld be both convictable and
co mmittable. T he loss of co ntrol sta ndard should be rejec ted for
the reaso ns Part III provides, but at least it a tte mpts to be both a
genuin e non-respon sibility a nd limiti ng standard . A forti o ri , and
co ntra ry to Justice Scalia's asserti o n in Cran e, th e causal link standard is even less accepta ble because it is not and cannot be either a
limiting or non-respons ibility standard. Th e causal link standard
permits invo luntary civil commitment for dangerousness alone and
must be rejected.
In addition to over- inclu siveness, causal link standards invite potentially misl eadin g expert testimony. The causal link be twee n
mental abnormality and legally relevant conduct is established, in
brief, by demonstrating that the agent has an irrational reason for
action that mental diso rder produced and th at the agent's irrational
reason was at least in part a cause of the legally relevant be havior.
The agent's reason for action and wh e ther it is produced by ment al
disorder are fac tual questions; whether that reason was a ca use of
behavior within the age nt's practical rea so n is a common-sense
conclusion; whether that reason was evidence of s ufficient lack of
capacity for rationality to warrant an ascription of non-responsibility
is a normative, legal qu estion . Excellent mental health clinicians can
help to identify an agent 's mental states, including an age nt 's reasons for action, but th ey beg the res ponsibility question if they
simply conclude from a causal link, as many do , th at the agent cannot control himself or is n on-respo nsible . The problem is that,
when disease or disord er are implica ted in the causation of behavior, the misleading, qu estion-begging metaphor of mechanism-the
thought that behavioral symptoms are simply mechanisms and not
actions-always threa te ns to intrud e and to predispose decision-
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makers to infer non-r es p o nsibility. '~ Thus, the ca usal link standarers conceptual problem of over-inclusiveness will be potentiated
in practice by expert test imo ny concerning di sorder an d disease .
F in al ly , ge nuinely helpful exp ert testimony abo ut the "mental abnormality '' criter ion , as Kansas defines it , is im possibl e because the
crite ri on is so obscure and unm oored from any so und clinical or
scie ntific foun dati on.
T he broader impli catio ns of t he causal link standa rd are also extremely disquieting. If th e causal link standa rd is constitutionally
acceptab le , the logic of Hendricks and Crnne implies that all peopl e
charged with or convicted of vi o lent offenses who have some me ntal abnormality that predis poses them to commit those offenses arc
potentially committabl e. T his would still be tru e if an adequ ate,
non-circular definition of me ntal abnormality were provided beca use even then a causa l link does not entail non-responsibility.
T he problem would be exacerbated if the Ka nsas definition of
"mental abnormality" were accepted. All pred ispositions to commit offenses would satisfy Kansas's causal link between mental
abnormality and legally relevant behavior because all predispositions to commit legally relevant behavior are seriously abnormal.
Suppose, for example, that a state wished to apply an involuntary commitment law to a class of dangerous people broader than
sexual predators, such as "mentally abnormal violent predators. "
Us ing the Kansas definition of a sexual predator as a model and
m aking on ly two changes-omitting the two references to sex-the
definition of a violent predator would be this: "any person who has
bee n convicted of a violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely
to e ngage in the repeat acts of violence." Othe rwise, let us assume ,
th e statute is indistinguishable from the Kans as statute , except that
it gives a more adequate definition of mental abnormality. Other
than its scope of application , this statute is conceptually and legally
indistinguishable from the Kansas commitment statute that passed
constitutional muster in Hendricks. Depending in part on how
broadly or narrowly the " violent offenses" criterion was interpreted ,~
4

·'' The metaphor of mecha ni sm is discussed in more de tail a t infra tex t accompanying
notes 87- 88.
' ' for exa mpl e , the Supre me Co urt has previously been untro uble d by usin g th e
threa t o f a re latively min o r property crime as the predicate for a findin g o f

I
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would permit the ind efinite involuntary civil commitment of an
immense proportion of criminals wh o would otherwise be se nte nce d to pri son or released after serving a full prison term. For
example, large numbers of people in prison, especially males, meet
the diagnos tic cri teria for Antisocial Personalit y D is order."' I nde ed ,
cond uct tha t vio lates th e penal co de is precise ly the type of cond uct
th at justifies the d ia gnos is. Sa ti sfying the causal link sta nda rd for
commi tmen t wo uld present little pro blem in such cases, threatening li berty broad ly. The Crane maj ority was cogn izant of this
problem and imposed an indepe nden t contro l criterion to avoid it."''
For th e reas ons t his Essa y gives, however, T do ubt that the independent co ntro l criterion will be an ade quate prophylactic.
I recognize that our so ciety seems specia ll y to fear sexual violence and that , at prese nt, the motivation to create broad civil
co mmitme nt sc he mes to confine violent criminals gene r ally may
not exist. T he lack of such motivation is a hi storic ally contingent
fact , however, ra ther th an a principled objection. Thus, causal link
standards represent a re a l and persistent threat to liberty.
T he causal link standard is a potentially profound, broad threat
to li berty, to th e distinction between crime and disorder, and to the
co nsequent distinction between civil and criminal confinement. As
Crane correctly recognized, th e causal link standard does not satisfy substantive due process. In the future, courts should not be
blinded by necessarily non-substantive, cosmetic changes in causal
link commitment criteria that appear to embrace a serious control
problem. Substantive du e process should require a genuinely limitdange rousness to support continued invo luntary co mmit ment of a person acqu itted
by reaso n of insanity. See J o nes v. U ni ted S ta tes, 463 U.S. 354,365 (1983) .
'' David T. Lykk c n , The Antisocial Personalities 4-6 (1995); Vernon L. Q uin sey et
a l.. Violent Offend ers: Appra isi ng and Managing Risk 75- 76 (1998) (no tin g a lso that
almost all prisone rs have some diagnosable menta l disorder). But se e Lee N. Robin s
et a l.. A nt isocia l Pe rso na lity, in Psychia tri c Diso rd e rs in America: The epidemiologic
Carchmenr Area Study 258, 260-61 (Lee N. Robins & D arre l A. R egier eds., 1991)
(findin g th at only a min ority of arres ted perso ns met crit er ia for anti-social
pe rso nali ty) .
'" E.g., Kansas v. Cra ne, 534 U.S . 407, 122 S. Ct. 867, 870 (2002) (not ing that 40 to 60
percent of the male priso n population may be diagnosed as havi ng Antisocial Perso nality
D iso rder). Co mm enta to rs have a lso recognized th e impli cat ions. See, e.g., Mara Lynn
Kronga rd, A Pop ul at ion at Risk: Civi l Commitm en t of Substance Abusers After
Kansas v. Hendricks, 90 Ca l. L. R ev. 111 (2002) (claiming ge ner al ly that Hendricks
unjustifiably broad e ned the sco pe of civil commitme nt and that substa nce abusers as a
cla ss arc a t specific risk for co mmitment) .
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ing and workable non-respo nsibility stand ard as a predicate for invo lunt ary civil commi tmen t. T he next Part suggests tha t a
ge nuin ely independent co ntro l sta ndard ap pea rs to sa tisfy th e n onres ponsibility conditi on, as Crone held , bu t th at thi s stanclmcl is
sca rce ly more conce ptu all y sa ti sfacto ry or worka ble than a pure
ca usa l link standard .

III ... UN CONTRO LLA B LE URGES "
It is comm o n to say of people that they generally lack se lf-

co ntrol or that they los t contro l on a specific occasion. Depending
o n th e circumstances a nd th e ap plicable m oral and legal standa rd
imp osed, such locuti ons are u sed both to ascribe blam e and to excuse the age nt. In the case of Le roy H endri cks, fo r exampl e, th e
criminal justice sys te m b lamed a nd punished him fo r yielding to hi s
all egedly uncontroll abl e urges; the sexual predator commitm ent
syste m in effect excused him , found him non-responsible , beca use
it co mmitted him on the ground that he could no t control precisely
the sam e urges and rela ted co nduct that led to the te n-year prison
sentence for sexual molestati on that preceded his commitment. But
how could it be fair to ho ld responsible and punish an agent fo r
yielding to urges th at are impossible or suprem ely difficult to control? This Part of the E ssay claims that our ambivalence about
control problems is caused by a confused understanding of the nature of those proble ms and argu es th at control or volitional
problems should be aband oned as legal criteria. On conceptual and
scie ntific grounds, loss o f co ntrol , as usu ally understood, is not an
adequate limiting, non-responsibility standard fo r involuntary civil
co mmitment. On practica l gro unds , it will impose almost no limit
on commitment.
Let us begin with the phe nomenology of an alleged control
pro blem. Suppose that a person has a powe rful desire to do some thing that it is unwise, immo ral, or illegal.s7 That is, the agent really,
really, really wants to do som ething wrong. Im agine an agent with
extre mely strong sexual des ires who is in a situ ation of great te mpta tion. Hold constant the agent 's subjective strength of desire and
temptation in the foll owing scenarios. If the situ ation is the privacy
" Other terms mi gh t be substitut ed for " desire," such as " urge ," " imp ulse," or
·'wa nt ," but, fo r all p ractica l pu rposes. th ey are synonymo us in thi s co ntext.
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of the bedroom with o ne' s cons e nting spouse, t he agent is luck y,
and there is no problem o f wi sdom, mor alit y. o r leg ality. But suppose that the other is a willing stranger. but ne ithe r has the means
to engage in protected sex . O r suppose th a t th e age nt is in a h ote l
roo m with th e willin g spo use o f <m o th e r. F ina ll y. supp ose th at the
age nt is Lero y H e ndri cks , in th e co mpa ny of a n a ttr act ive child.
In all fo ur cases the age n t inte nse ly desires to have sex, bu t why
mi ght we conclu de that a ny o r th e m is not res po nsi ble fo r hi s or he r
se xua l be havior? ln th e latte r three cases the pe rson had a good
pr act ica l, moral , or lega l reas on not to e ngage in sex, but th e
stre ngth of the des ire was by hypoth esis th e sa me in all four cases .
Sex ual desires , lik e all desires, might be produ ce d by genetic predi sposition, by soci ali zat ion expe riences, by part icul a r situations, or
by a hos t o f o th er ca uses, but a desire is sim ply a de sire , howeve r it
is produce d. D es ires a nd te mpta tions, whe ther " no rmal " or " abnorm al," may be strong or we ak , persistent o r sudd e n. It is of
co urse e asier, in th e coll oqui al se nse, to be have wi se ly , morally,
and legally if an agent d oes not have suddenly ari sing, strong desires to behave unwisely, immorally, or illega lly. Moreover, failur e
to sa tisfy strong d esires can cause very unpl easa nt fe elings, such as
tension , anxiety , and frustrati on. Nonethe less , what does it me an to
say th at an agent "can 't help it " when the age nt yields to strong desires that will cause unpleasant feelings if they are n ot satisfied ?
If an agent's body is lite rall y forced to move , say, b y operatio n of
a genuine reflex, then th e agent , for legal purposes, has not acted at
all , because the law's concept of action requires in tentional bodily
move ment. Conduct caused by strong desi res, however, is surely
human action and no t a bi ophysical mech a ni sm . Note, too , that th e
stre ngth of the desire, and no t its normality o r abnormality, is what
mo ti va tes the conclusio n that perhaps the agent cannot help himse lf. T he alleged abn orm a lity of a des ire is no t a proxy for its
stre ngth. A fter all , we would not conclude th a t an agent who yields
to a we ak desire canno t he lp himself, even if the desire is abnorm a ll y caused or abnorm al in itself.
In th e examples, the agent 's instrumental practical reason see ms
entirely unimpaired. T he agent strongly des ires sex, a desire that is
bo th common and easy to understand, and belie ves that sexual
co nt act with an availabl e o ther will satisfy th e desire . So, the agen t
fo rms th e intention to h ave sex and acts on th e inte ntion. W hen
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Lero y H e ndricks 's hand alights on the body of a child , that effect is
not simply a neuro muscular spasm, and it is instrume ntally rati o nal
in li ght of Hendricks 's desires a nd beli efs . Furthe rmore. virtua lly
all age nts who yield to strong and eve n sudde n or surprising desires
to behave unwi sely, immorally, or illega ll y ful ly recogni ze. as Leroy
Hendricks adm it tedly did, that yie ldin g is wrong. Eve n if th e condu ct is the symptom of a recog nize e! di so rder, agen ts who yie ld in
such circumsta nces appea r quintesse nti all y respons ible for t heir
cond uct. ft is non e th eless o ft en claimed that th ey ·'co ul dn't he lp it "
and should therefo re be excused or treated as non-respo nsible.
Two doctrin es in criminal law negate responsibility because the
agent all eged ly acted "invo luntaril y": the absence of an act and
comp ulsion or duress. Let us conside r whether eit he r legal me aning of '' involuntariness," which seems to be synonymo us with lack
of capacity to control oneself, can help us understand what we
mean conceptually by loss of control. An agent is clearly not even
prima facie responsible, unless the agent's harmful bodily move ments are inte ntional actions. Even if an age nt acts intentionally,
he wi ll be held non-responsible if he acts in response to compulsion
or duress, because he has b ee n placed in a hard choice situation.
We co uld not fairly hold him accountable for yie lding to a sufficient threat.
In the case of no action , the bodily movement is literally in voluntary , literally a mechanism, because it is caused by something
other than the age nt's practical reason that produces an intenti on.
In the case of duress, however, involuntariness is both metaphorical and a legal labe l affixed to agents who are co nsidered nonresponsible. In either case , if the agent causes harm, we conclude
that the agent co uld not h elp it, and we hold her non-respons ible.
Again, in the case of no action, the agent litera ll y coul d not help it.
In th e case of duress, she could help it , but we cannot fairly expect
her to help it, and thus we say, metaph orically, th at she cou ld not
and ascribe non-responsibility. Can either theory explain loss of
controi, as this standard is used, when evaluatin g th e responsibility
of sexual predators?
I bel ieve that the metaphor of mech anism is the most misleading
so urce of the intuition th at some people cannot control some de sires, especi all y if we believe that the desires are produced by
neuroche mical or other brain abnorm al ities. T hi s mechanistic me ta-
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phor is powerful because mechanistic events are not proper objects
of respo nsibili ty ascription. T hus, if action tha t ·· yields '' to a stro ng
''abnorm al" desire is "just like" a bioph ys icall y involuntary bodily
move me nt. th e n yielding is apparently not resp o nsible act ion. T his
is simpl y an ana logy, ho wever, and it is flmved. Reca ll that a desire
is si mply a desire. whe ther it is caused by biol ogical abnormalities
or the alignment of the planets. There is no literal p hysi cal compulsio n. as there is in cases of reflex , spasm, and the like . lt is litera ll y
true tha t an <igcnt cannot help a reflex ive bodil y m ovement, but is
it true that an age nt can not help acti ng to sati sfy at leas t some
strong de sires in so me situations?
To cash out the mechanistic metaphor, exam ples of the following kind are given.'' Assume that an age nt needs to urinate, but is
unable to find an appropriate place to do so . As time passes and
the bladder continues to fill, the desire to urin ate will become increasingly powerful and unpleasant. At some point, however, the
pe rson's bladder will empty because the pressure on the uret hral
(urinary) sphincter will mechanically force it to open; he or she will
no longer be able to "hold it in," no matter what the cost might be
for doing so. For example, suppose the agent is threatened with
death for permitting his bladder to empty. The agent will surely
exercise control for a very lengthy period, but all agents will finally
empty their bladders because, ultimately, voiding will be a product
of litera lly uncontrollable mechanism. T he sphincter "fails" because the physical pressure on it is too great.
Strong desires are allegedly analogous to the full bladder. Increasing desire is analogized to increasing pressure on the sphincter,
and we are supposed to conclude that people are no more responsible for yieldin g to some desires than they are fo r emptying their
bladders. B ut desires are not physical forces, actions are not
mechanisms, and people are not sphincters. There are no "desire
units" that will finally m echanistically force the "action switch" to
flip if enough "desire units" are added. Assuming that Leroy
Hendricks wants to live, if we threaten him with immediate death

"' Th is specifi c exa mple was first suggested by a n anonymo us participa nt at a
confe re nce . O ne ca n e ndlessly devise such exa mples. See, e .g. , Stephe n J. Morse,
Hooked o n Hype : Add iction a nd Responsibili ty, 19 L. & Phil. 3. 28- 30 (2000) .
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for touching a child, he will not touch a child. '~ The analogy to literal mechanism fai ls, but if the mechanistic picture is in one's he ad ,
it is easy to conclude that the sexual predator cannot control himself.
Now let us consider whether a compulsion or duress theory can
explain the conclusion that some agents who suffer from intense
and allegedly abnormal desires cannot control themselves. Assume
that an agent is being threatened with a horrible death unless he
kills two people. At some point, it will seem almost impossible not
to yi el d to the threat. Almost any agent might yield, no matter
what the cost might be for doing so.
Duress is an excuse to crime only if an agent is threatened wi th
death or grievous bodily harm, a person of reasonable firmness
would yield in the situation, and the agent is not at fault for placing
herself in the threatening situation.'~' Thus, we might finally excuse
the agent but not because the agent had a volitional or control
problem. Again, the agent's reasoning is intact, and his will, his volition,~~ operates effectively to save his life by forming and acting on
the intention to kill the hapless victims. The reason to excuse the
agent would be that he faced a dreadfully hard choice for which he

'"See Judith V. Becker & John A. Hunter, Jr. , Evaluation of Treatment Outcome
for Adult Perpetrators of Child Sexual Abuse, 19 Crim. Just. & Behav. 74, 82 (1992)
(noting that probation and its supervision are effective in reducing "atypical" sexual
conduct). Becker and Hunter also report other research indicating that sexual
offenders commit many more sexual offenses than those for which they arc arrested.
This too suggests that sexual offenders are able to " control themselves" when the risk
of apprehension is substantial.
What reasons would have motivational salience in an individual case is of course an
open question, and individual agents will respond to different reasons. For example.
drug addicted pregnant women who will not otherwise forego drugs are more likely to
remain abstinent and to atte nd full day treatment if they are paid regularly with a
voucher system to do so. See, e.g., Hendrc c E. Jones et al. , The Effectiveness of
Incentives in Enhancing Treatment Attendance and Drug Abstinence in MethadoneMaintained Pregnant Women, 61 Drug & Alcohol Dependence 297 (2001 ). The point
is simply that the actions of sexual offenders are actions, not mechanisms, and thus
potentially reason-responsive.
The example in the text might also suggest that if it takes a gun to one 's head to
motivate a person not to engage in certain actions, then it must be very hard not to
perform those actions. Again , this is, in a colloquial sense, best explained in terms of a
rationality defect, as Part IV explains, but it docs not mean that there is anything
wrong with the agent's will.
"'Model Penal Code§ 2.09(1) (1985).
'" Sec Moore, supra note 79. at 113- 65.
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is no t responsible, a nd we co uld no t fa irl y e xpect him not to yield
whe n threaten ed wi th deat h.
The agent face d with th e threat of fru strati on of strong inte rnal
desires is esse ntia ll y claimin g an '' inte rn al du ress '' excuse . B ut is
th e frustration o f desire the equi va le nt o f the expe rience of dea th ,
gri e vo us bodil y harm, or ago nizin g pain? U nl ik e the litera l involunt arines s of mechani sm, the me taphorical in vo lunt ariness of
duress is a cont inuum concept. Frust rat ion an d re lated un pleasa nt
fee ling sta tes may be psycho logicall y pa inful, b ut eve n if t he desire
and its strength a re not th e agent 's fa ult, th ink how much psycholo gical pain mu st be thr ea ten ed to consi de r an age nt not
responsible for se xual vio le nce . No te , furth er. th at if the age nt 's
pr imary reason for yie ld in g is the positive p ursuit of pleas ure
ra ther than the avo idance of threa te ne d psyc ho logical p ain , then
th ere is no hard choice and " internal duress" wo uld not obtain.
If non-culp able hard choice is the reason wh y we mi ght excuse
some agents who yield to strong inte rnal desires , this nonresponsibility condition wo uld be rare in general and in the case of
sexual predators in particular. Alm os t all agents predisposed to
yield to strong desires to do wrong, especially se rious wrongs like
sexual violence , would be considered responsibl e because the
threat of psychological pain will seldo m be sufficiently great to excuse . A nd again , even if we did exc use agents fo r this reason in
some cases, there is no contro l defect. The agent' s will operates effectively indeed to end the psych ological pain by satisfyin g the
desire . The non-respon sibili ty conditi o n, if one obtains a t all,
would be a sufficiently hard choice th e agent faces through no fa ult
of her own.
Loss of control as a non-responsibility condi tion is a colloquial
concept that gains und ese rved credibility whe n it is analogized to
" involuntariness" caused by mech anism or m ost cases of duress.
Non etheless, is there a res idual, common sense meaning of loss of
control that m akes sense? H uman beings can be subject to strong
desires that leave them feeling subj ectively unfree and that appear
to have coercive motiva ti onal force. I ndeed , in many cases, the desires or urges may be experienced as "ego-alie n," as if the y were
being imposed on the age nt rather th an being p art of the agent. It
is surely harde r to beha ve well whe n one ha s stro ng desires to do
wrong because the prospect of satisfaction is so pleasant , the pros-
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pect of frustration is so painful, and the combination of these prospects te nds to diminish our ability to be able to bring reason to
bear about what we should do. But desires and fears of frustration
and related feeling states are once again not physical force s that
litera!lv force one 's bodv to move if thev reach sufficient intensi tv.
They work through the agent's practical reason. ~ ' Part IV explains
that loss of control is much better understood as a rationality problem than as a volitional defect.
Los:; of control, as an independent state or condition that undermines responsibility, does not gain much support fr om related
scientific or clinical data. Loss of control is not a technical term,
but empiri cal research concerning addictions , impulses , im pulsivity,
and di5orders of impulse control is probably the most re levant to
the legal meaning of loss of control. In basic and clinical science ,
however, there is no consensus about the conceptual meaning, the
93
definition, or the measurement of these terms. Some definitions
are simply question-begging about the agent's ability to control his
or her conduct. F or example, the American Psychiatric Association
defines the "essential feature" of an impulse control disorder as,
"the failure to resist an impulse, drive, or temptation to perform an
act that is harmful to the person or to others. " 94 But why does the
person fail to resist, and is the reason one that suggests that the
person is not responsible for the failure? The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders explains further: "[T]he
individual feels an increasing sense of tension or arousal before
-

.)
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,. Most self-control mechanisms we use to control the untoward effects of our
desires arc techniques that facilitate the use of reason, prevent us from acting when
we act '·unthinkingly," or prevent us from being in situations in which we recognize
that we act unthinkingly.
1
' ' E.g., Morse, supra note 88, at 8 (noting that there is no consensus definition of
"addiction"); James D. A. Parker & R. Michael Bagby, Impulsivity in Adults: A
Critical Review of Measurement Approaches, in Impulsivity: Theory, Assessment.
and Treatment 142, 142 (Christopher D. Webster & Margaret A. Jackson eels., 1997)
(stating that there is no consensus definition of impulse and describing the low
correlation between various research measures of impulsivity).
'!' DSM-IV-TR. supra note 50,
at 663. Examples of such disorders include
pyromania. kleptomania, and pathological gambling. The primary mental disorders
sexual predators have-paraphilias and Antisocial Personality Disord er-are not
specifically categorized as disorders of impulse control , but. like substance
dependence and abuse, they share many features with disorders of impulse control.
lei.
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committ ing the act and then experi e nces pleasure, grati ficct ti on, or
re lief at the tirne of committ ing the act. Following th e act the re
may or ma y not be regre t, sel f-r e proach , or guilt. ,.,, B ut does the
presence of increasing te nsio n or arousai m ean tha t the agent cannot cont ro l hi mse lf. and can we validly measure su ch states and the
s upposed loss of con tra !?
In this general a rea of research , good o bj ective me ::tsures or the
ope rative te rms. such as tension a nd ar o usa l, often d o not exist,
and thus m ake valid empirical res earch imposs ib le . l'v1e asures with
som e apparent validi ty ofte n do not corre late. In a cr ude . com monse nse fas hion , \Ve can estimate the stre ngth o f a d esire by observing
how much the age nt is willing to sacrifice to sa tisfy it, bu t this is a
far cry from a repeatabie, objective, independ e nt meas ure o f
strength of desire. w' Eve n when the resea rch is good . in the a bse nce
of a successful account of "uncontrollability," re search ca nno t tell
us whether failure to r esist is "controllable" b ecause the research
concerns human action and not mechanisms. ~ This research does
no t investigate how m a ny "desire units" are necess ary mechanica lly to flip the " action switch."
I am not making the unjustifiably skeptical claim that good research has taught us nothing in the domain of behaviora l control.
Indeed , we know a great deal about the variables that contribute to
what Professor Thomas Schelling memorabl y describes as the " in9
timate contest for self-command." x For example , all things being
equal , agents who discount time steeply or who are reward7

"' Id.
" Se e Dennis M. D o novan. Assessment of Addictive Be haviors: Implications of an
E merging Biopsychosocial Model , in Assessment o f Addictive Behaviors 3, 6 (De nnis
M. Don ova n & G. Alan Marlatt eels. , 1988) .
11
' Th ere hav e been a tt e mp ts to m easure loss of control directly. but these efforts
have bee n question-beggin g failures because they circularly includ e loss o f control as
o ne of th e criteria for the in ab ility to control oneself. See Stephen J. Morse. From
Siko ra to Hendricks: Mental Disorder and Crimin a l Resp o nsibilit y, in The Evolution
o f Mental H ea lth Law 129, 161- 62 (Lynda E. Frost & Rich a rd J. Bonnie e els., 2001) .
.,, Thom as C. Schellin g, Ch o ice and Con sequen ce 57 (1 984 ). See gen e rally G eo rge
A in slie . Breakdown of Will (2 001 ) (applying hyperbo lic di sco untin g th eory to
problem s of willpowe r and loss of control a nd claiming th a t defects of the will are
di stingui shabl e from ra tionality defec ts) ; Albert B a ndura , Self-Efficacy: The Exe rcise
o r Control (1997) (prov iding a n ove rview of the fi e ld and a prese ntation of "se lfefficacy .. theory); Howa rd R achlin, The Scie nce of Self-Co ntrol (2000) (prov iding a
review of resea rch and a th eo retica l account of self-control ba se d on '·te leol ogical
be ha vio ri sm " ).
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inse nsiti ve are more like ly to be have wrongly than age nts who discount time shall owly or who are reward-sensitive. Unfortunately,
however , we have no scientific measure o f wh e ther, ultimate ly, an
agent can control him se lf, and rational capacity defects are the
variables that, in most cases, cause an agent to find it difficult to
99
control him se lf. lt was precis ely fo r these types of re aso ns , for example. that durin g the ferment of insanity defense reform in the
early 1980s, the A merican Psychiatri c Association recommended
abolition of the con tro l or volitional prong of the insanity cle,
f ens e .
E ven if there were such ind epe ndent e ntiti es as irresistibl e desires, which I deny, we cannot di stingui sh between an irresistible
d es ire and o ne s imply not resi sted . I fully believe Leroy Hendricks
when he reports that he subjectively feels that his urges are "uncontrollable," and experiencing some urges as ego-alien may seem
101
to increase those urges ' coercive motivational salience. Nevertheless, despite the honesty of subj ective reports of alleged
uncontrollability, we do not know whe ther this is objectively the
case. Such subjective feelings, however honest they may be, cannot
substitute for conceptual and empirical demonstrations that people
genuinely cannot control themselves.
Loss of control as a non-responsibility condition is so conceptually unclear and empirically unresolved that it invites unhelpful ,
potentially misleading, and conclusory expert testimony when it is
raised. All too often, "expert" opinions about whether an agent
was capable of self-control are based on a purely common-sense
evaluation that anyone could perform, inform e d implicitly or explicitly by the expert's private, subj ective moral view about
\()t l

''''Se c H.L.A. Hart , Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law
32-33 (1968) (explaining that the criminal la w is much mo re cautious about granting,
excusing, or mitigatin g conditi ons based on " defects of the will" than on "defect of
knowledge" because th e former are vagu er and more subjective).
wu Am. Psychiatric Ass'n Insan ity D ef. Work Group, Statement o n the Insanity
D efense, reprinted in 140 Am. J. of Psychiatry 681- 88 (1983). Th e American Bar
Association reached the sa me conclusion for th e same reason. Am . Bar Ass 'n , ABA
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 330, 339-42 (1984).
10 1
The crucial term in the add icti on literatu re to describe such feelings is
" compulsive" or "craving." See, e .g., Alan I. Leshner, A ddi ction is a Brain Disease,
and It Matters, 278 Sci. 45, 46 (1997). But see Morse, supra note 88, at 4-19
(questioning the preceding cle fini tion).
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whether the agent sho uld be held responsible . They are clearly not
based on expert. scientifically, or clinically ground ed unde rstandings or mea surements of la ck of control. Moreover, such experts
are usuall y me ntal health professionals who almost always support
their op inions with diagnoses of di so rder or dise ase, thus fa cilitat ing the misl ead ing m e taph or of and a nal ogy to mec hani sm. After
all , diseases are m ec ha ni sms. '0/e do not ho ld m ali gnant cells responsible for metast as izing, a nd we do not hold peop le with cance r
responsible for failin g to prevent me tastas is. As we have seen.
howeve r, hum an action is no t pure me chanism , even if it is th e
symptom of a disord e r. but e xpert testimo ny in advertently blurs
this crucial distincti o n. Th e loss of control standard , therefore , has
the further defect of pe rmitting, and even encouraging, unhelp ful
and po tentially misle ading expert tes timony.
The criminal justice system is th e appropriate mech anism for
control of responsible preda tors. Agents who are not responsible
for their predatory sexual violence may properly be confined involuntarily, but such a massive deprivation of libe rty should be
inflicted only on those preda tors who are genuinely not responsible. The difficulty is defining the criteria for non-responsibility.
Even if a state seems to impose a genuinely independent, serious
lack of control proble m criterion, as Crane requires, the definition
of such a problem is so inevitably amorphous that this criterion will
impose no practical limit on abnormal sexual predator commitments. Mental health professionals will have no difficulty adjusting
their expert testimony to support th e conclusion that virtually any
sexually viol ent offender meets the serious lack of control standard. Moreover, there is nothing in the language of Hendricks and
Crane that would permit an appellate judge to overturn a jury verdict of serious loss of control, except, perhaps, in extreme, obvious
cases. 11 12 Loss of control as an independent non-responsibility condition simply will not suffice on conceptual, scientific, and practical
grounds.

1" ' Such cases would probably be marked by a n all eged predator's hi sto ry th at is
e ntirely inconsis te nt with a colloquial control proble m and by patently deficient
expert testimony. I assume, however, that such cases would be rare, especially if there
were a history of sex ual predation.
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AN D YVORKAB LE

N ON-RESPO NSIBILITY STt\ NDA RD

Thi s P art argues that the lack of th e capacity for ra tional ity is th e
ce ntral and normatively proper non-re sponsibility criteri o n in both
iaw and ord inary morality. 1t can be applied wor k: a bl y a nd fa irl y
an d lec\ves ro om fo r moraL p oliti ca L an d leg al deb a te abou t the
ap propriate: limi ts o n responsibility. Th e "co ntrol" language used
in H endricks. Crone, a nd other cases a nd sta tutes is m etaph orical
and be tter u nderstood in terms of rati ona lit y defects . H uman b e ings co ntro l th e m se lves by using their reaso n. If t he y ca nn o t use
t he ir reaso n, it is very difficult to be have properly . No logical o r le ga l reaso n prevents a court from und ers tanding and interpre ting
"control" p robl e ms as rationality defect s. Indeed , Crane's invitation to the sta tes to find emotional or cognitive so urces of co ntrol
problems suggests a potentially broad understa nding of lack of contro l.
Lack of capacity for rationality is alm ost always the most
straightforward explanation of why we colloquially say that some
peopl e cannot control themselves when they expe rience intense
desires. More important, it is a genuine and limiting condition of
non-responsibility rather than a metaphoric ground . B oth decisionm akers and experts would understand the issues and their
tas ks more cle arly if lack of capacity for rationality were the standard in sexual predator commitment cases. At least some potentially
sexually violent people may indeed lack substantial capacity for rationality when confronted with persistent , inte nse sexual desires. If
so, they are not responsible for their sexual conduct , and they may
justifiably be involuntarily committed if future violence can be
predicted with sufficient accuracy.
If we con sider the legal and moral standa.rds of responsibility
most broadly, it is clear that the capacity for rationality is t h e primary criterion and that t he lack of such capacity is t he foundational
criterion for non-responsibility. Only Jack of rationality can explain
t he diverse conditions that undermin e responsibility, including,
a mong others, infancy, mental disord e r , dementia , and extre m e
stress or fatigue. F or example, children do not b e com e more responsible as they mature simply because they grow older, taller, or
heavier; they become more responsible because an increase in the
capacity for rationality , including its emotion al component , accom-

•

2002]

Uncontrollob!e Urges

1065

pan ics n ormal de ve lopm e nt through chilclhoocl and ado lesce nce .
Me ntal disord er , dementia, and extreme stre ss do not t urn pe op le
int o aut omatons or mechanisms. Such conditi ons. for which th e
age nt is ge nera lly no t responsible, undermin e t he capacity for rati o nalit y.
In lavv and m ora lity , when a perso n mak e.; a pl ·c a for rn itigati on
or excuse from the ordin ary consequence s of be ha vio r. th e agent is
virtuall y a lways cl <:timing that hi s or he r cap acit y for n tt ion a lity vvas
non -culpably undermin e d in the context in iss ue. \:V hcn t he la w
co nsid ers civil an d criminal standards of co mpt:t c nce- such as
compete nce to contract or competence to stand tri ai --Dr crimi na l
standard s of respon sibility-such as the insanity defe nse or "diminish ed capacity "-the underlying reason for non-respon sibi lity th at
justifies such rules is the lack of capacity for rati o nal ity. Indeed , as
I a rgue below, if one examines closely most case s of a lleged " loss
of control," they essentially raise claims that, for som e reason , the
agent could not " think straight " or bring reason to bear und er the
circumstances.
Brief reflection on the concept of the person that law and morality employ and on the nature of law and morality suggests that the
capacity for rationality must be the central condition of responsibility. What distinguishes human beings from the rest of th e natural
world is that we are endowed with the capacity for re ason , the capacity to use moral and instrumental reasons to guide our conduct. 1111
F or adults , the capacity for rationality is the quintesse ntial condition of mental "normality," and the lack of the capacity for
rationality is the quintessential condition of "m e ntal a bnormality. " .
L aw guides human conduct by giving citizens prudential and moral
reasons for conduct. Law would be powerless to achieve its primary goal of regulating human interaction if it did no t operate

"'' See J o hn R. Searle. E nd of th e Revo lution , N.Y. R ev. of Book s. Feb. 28, 2002 , at
33 . Professor Sea rl e writes:
Once we ha ve th e possibility of explaining particular fo rms o r hum a n behavi o r
as fo llowin g rules, we have a very rich expl a nat o ry app ara tus th a t diffe rs
dra ma tically from th e e xpl a natory appar a tus o f the na tural sc ie nces. When we
say we are fo llowing rule s, we are a ccepting th e notion of me nt a l cau sation and
th e a tt e ndant noti o ns of ra tionality and existence of no rms .... Th e co ntent of
th e rul e d oes not just describe wh a t is happening bu t pl ays a pa rt in making ir
/zap pen.
Id . a t 35.
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through t he practical reason of the agents it addresses and if age nts
were not capable of rationally understa nding the rules and their
1
app lic at io n under the circumstances in which the age nt acts. "-l
Respo nsibilit y is a normative condition that law and morality attribute on ly to human bein gs. 'vVe do no t ascribe respo nsibility to
inanim ate na tural forces or to other spec ies. Holdin g an agent responsibl e means simply that it is fair to require th e agent to sat isfy
mor a l and lega l ex pectations and to be ar th e conseq uences if he o r
she does not d o so; ho ldin g an agent no n-respo nsibl e me ans simpl y
t hat we do not be li e ve the age n t was capable in th e context in qu estion of sa ti sfyin g m o ral and legal expectations. The central rea so n
why an agent mi ght not be able to be guided by moral and lega l
expectations is that the agent was not capable of be in g guid e d by
reason. Again, it is not a condition of res ponsibility that an agent
was guided by reason or acte d rationally in a given situation. It is
sufficient if the agent retained the capacity for rationality.
L ack of compulsion or lack of duress is also a condition of responsibility, and compulsion or duress are non-responsibility
conditions. Compulsion and duress do not excuse because the
agent lacks the capacity for rationality. They excuse because the
agent is placed in an extremely hard choice situation through no
fault of he r own , and we beli eve that it is not fair to ask the agent
to bear the ordinary consequences for yielding to a threat. If th e
situation of compulsion or duress is so deranging that it renders the
agent irrational , th e n the core irrationality criterion of nonresponsibility will obtain. Most duress standards in civil and crimi-

'""S ee Sco tt J. Sh apiro , Law. M oral ity, and the G uidance of Co nduct , 6 Lega l
Theory 127 (2000). Thi s view assum es th a t la w and mora lity are suffi cie ntl y kn owab le
to g uide co ndu ct. but a co ntrary ass umption is la rge ly incoh e re n t. As Professor
Shapiro writ es:
Lega l ske pticism is an absurd doctrine. It is abs urd becau se th e law cann ot be
th e sort or thing th a t is unknowab le. If a sys te m of norms were unknowab le,
th e n that syste m would not be a legal syst e m. One importa nt reason wh y the
law mu st be k nowab le is that its function is to guid e conduct.
Id at 131.
As Professo r John Sea rl e put it: " One condition of rule-guided explanation s is that
the rul es have to be th e so rts of things that one could actually follow." Searl e . supra
note L03 . at 35 .
I clo not ass ume th a t lega l rules are a lways cl ea r a nd thus capabl e of preci se ac tion
guidance. If most rul es in a lega l syste m were not s ufficie ntly cl ea r most of th e tim e,
howeve r, the system could no t function.
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nal law are extremely limited and do not apply in the vast majority
of cases in which an agent asks to be excused from the ordinary
consequences of behavior.
Law and moralit y con siste ntl y use the lack of capaci ty for rea son
as the central non-responsibility criteri on . It is a thoroughly fa miliar standard that is applicabl e in a wid e variety of legal , mo ral, an d
everyday contexts. The ordinary. common-sense notion of rati o nality we use is a con geries of abilities, including the ability to pe rceive
relatively accurate ly . to reason instrumentally , to evaluate o ne's actions in the light o r reasons. to wei gh appropria te considerations ,
and the like. It <llso includes the capacity to feel appropriate emotional responses and to use those emotions to decide what on e has
reason to do.
No consensual, technical definition of the capacity for rationality
exists in law, morality, philosophy, or the behavioral sciences, but
this does not compel the conclusion that the law should abandon
the common sense , everyday understanding of the capacity for rationality that we all apply routinely and successfully in the ordinary
course of daily affairs, including in moral evaluation. One need not
await a consensual definition of rationality from philosophers,
economists, or psychologists to recognize that young children and
people suffering from delusions suffer from major rationality defects and, therefore, are not responsible for some behaviors. One
may also, without a consensual definition of rationality, understand
that people under severe stress usually cannot reason as well as
they can when they are not stressed and perhaps should be partially excused for improper behavior. Indeed, successful human
interaction and flourishing would be impossible if people were
generally unable to understand the practical reasoning of others
and to make assessments of the capacity for rationality. In contrast,
as Part III implies, although we also talk colloquially about and
appear to have an everyday understanding of loss of control, we do
not, in fact, have a good understanding of what we mean by lack of
control; successful human interaction does not depend on successfully assessing control capacity. Rationality assessment is crucial to
human existence; control assessment is not.
One might demand a more precise, uncontroversial definition of
the capacity for rationality than the common sense concept just described, but such a demand would be unreasonable. The common
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sense co ncept of rationality that we all e mploy is gro unded in o rdinary human experience and in understa nding of practical reason
and its cr iti cal role in human interaction. It is a norm a tive standard
th a t is always open to re visio n. 'We all everyw here and alwa ys use
the o rdinary noti on of the capaci ty for rat io nalit y to eva luate the
con d uct of ourselves and of ot hers. it co ul d not be o therwise for
creatu res like ourselves. To require more in ordin a ry, pract ical
human inte raction , including the operat ion of o ur legal system,
wou ld be imposs ibl e and unn ecessary. T he burde n of persuas io n
sho uld be piacecl squarely on those who vv ish to abandon the lack
of ca pacit y for rationality as the core non- responsibility conditio n.
We are justified in asking for compe lling reasons bo th to ab an don
the prese nt standard and to ado pt an alterna tive.
An attractive feature of the account of the capac it y for ratio nality as the touchstone of responsibility is that it does not commit
one to a ny particular political, moral , or lega l regime of responsibility. Indeed, it makes normative deb ate a bout how much capacity
is necessary for responsibility possible by providing the proper criteria for such debate. The capacity for rationality is a continuum
concept, and different amounts of the capacity might be required ,
depending on the context and on the individual and social interests
at stake. Rationality standards for responsibility can thus vary geographically and temporally in response to evolving moral, political,
and legal understandings.
Our society is morally, legally, and constitutionally committed to
the immense importance of individual liberty. Such a powerful
commitment suggests that a severe defect in the capacity for rationality should be required to warrant a conclusion of sufficient
non-responsibility to justify indefinite involuntary civil confinement. Let us therefore turn to an analysis of how the lack of
capacity for rationality standard would ap ply in the case of sexually
violent predators.
Most sexually violent agents are firmly in touch with reality, instrumentally rational, and fully aware of the applicable moral and
lega l rul es . The criteria for the recognized diagnoses that would
probably apply to most sexual predators , the paraphilias and personality disorders such as Antisocial Personality Disorder, do not
include cognitive defects that would lead to plausible claims to the

I
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contrary. 1n5 Predators who do not suffer from a recognized disorder
do not suffer from severe cognitive or m0od defects because such
defects virtually always would justify a diagnosis of a recognized
disorder. F urthermore, although predators ' sexual des ires and behavior may be statistically abnormal and morall y objectionable,
predators are instrumentally rational when they satisfy those deSires.
One might claim that the sexual predators ' desire s are themselves irrational. We do talk colloquially about the abnormality of
desires, especially if most people cannot understand such desires , if
the desires are intense, and if the desires are for goals that will
cause the agent substantial interpersonal or le ga l trouble. Further,
there have been philosophical attempts to make sense of talking
about the substantive rationality of desires. T hese efforts have
failed, however, because it is impossible uncontroversially to clas1116
sify desires as irrational in themselves, and loose, colloquial usage
cannot substitute for persuasive analysis when important matters
of public policy are at stake. If a desire seems abnormal, it is natural to assume that there is some abnormal underlying cause. Even
if some desires are considered a symptom of recognized mental
disorders, however, it is not conceptually required that the desires
be irrational or that the agent lack the general capacity for rationality when the agent acts on those desires.
In sum, it appears that most mentally abnormal sexual predators
are fully responsible for their sexually predatory conduct, even if
they suffer from a serious, recognized disorder, and, thus, they may
fairly be criminally convicted for their sexual crimes. 107 But, for the
same reason, most such predators do not meet the necessary non-

111
' See, e.g. , DSM-IV-TR, supra note 50, at 566 (stating the "essential features" of
the paraphilias: "recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies. sexual urges, or
behaviors generally involving" inappropriate objects of sexual desire and contact,
such as children).
106
Nozick, supra note 66, at 139-40.
107
Recall Justice Scalia's argument in Crane that predators who mee t the causal link
standard are not deterrable and are , thus, distinguishable from ordinary recidivists ,
presumably because the predators are not responsible. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,
122 S. Ct. 867, 874 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because most predators will satisfy
the causal link standard, one wonders if Justice Scalia meant to imply that almost
none are criminally responsible and should be acquitted at a criminal trial by reason
of insanity, thus obviating th e need for predator commitments.
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respon sibility standard that might justify invo luntary civil confineme nt. T herefore, I am cl aiming that, holding the agent's capacity
for rati onality constant, the eli gibility for punishment and the eligi1
bi lit y fo r in vol untary civil confinement are mutu ally exclusive . "'
T here is one argum ent abo ut the lack of capacit y for rationalit y
th at rnight apply in a limited number of sexu al predation cases .
These wo uld include cases in which the agent' s desire is so powe rfu l a nd insiste nt th at it gen uin ely compromi ses th e agent's abilit y
to th ink st raight, to bring reaso n to bear o n why th e person should
not ac t to satisfy th e desire. ~ In a rather straightforward sense.
some reo ple in the throes of intense desires may be genuinely un ab le to think of anything except satisfying the desire . The build-up
of the des ire and its non-sa ti sfaction may cause further distracting
and ofte n unpleasant feeling states, such as anxi e ty, irritation, exciteme nt , tension , and the like. If an agent cannot think of anythin g
else and strongly desires satisfaction, it is much more likely that th e
agent will act, especially if there is no immediate external circumstance , such as a police officer at the elbow, to concentrate th e
agen t's attention. In such cases, fundamental components of ration ality, such as the capacities to think clearly and to evaluate selfconsciously one's reasons for action, may be severely compromised. The agent may find it extremely difficult to contemplate
alte rnatives or coherently to weigh alternatives.
Let us apply this analysis to the case of the sexual predator.
U rges will arise , temptations will certainly occur, and opportunities
to act on those urges and temptations will inevitably present themselves, despite attempts to avoid urges, temptations, and
opportunities. Depending on the situation and on the agent's mental
cond ition , the agent m ay be subject to the kinds of difficulties just
described and may act with diminished capacity for rational
thought at that moment. Even then, the predator is not entirely
reward-insensitive , and som e reasons will affect him. Assuming
that th e predator wants to live, a gun at his he ad will give him sufficient reason not to assault others, and he will not do so. 1w
10

'"' I bo rrow the term " eligib ility" from Kyron Huigens, Solving th e Apprendi Puzzle,
90 Geo. L.J. 387, 419-20 (2002) (di scussing eligibility for punishme nt).
'"' Sec Mo rse, supra n ote 88, a t 38- 40.
"" As Dr. Johnson fam o usly sa id , " D epend upon it , Sir, wh e n a man knows he is to
be hanged in a fortni ght , it co nce ntra tes hi s mind wond e rfully." Ja mes BoswelL 2 The
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Nevertheless , this kin d of brute "management" technique is not
generally feasible. and the predator may indeed find it exce ptionally hard to bring reason to bear on some occasions.
Assuming that intense sexual desires can sometimes substantially compromise rationality and, thus, potentially can negate
responsibility for acting on those desires, a fundamental que sti on
remains: Is the age nt suffering from a rationality defect no net ht>
less responsible because he has placed himself in the situation in
which rationality ma y be compromised, and is he aware o r the
usual conseque nce s of diminished rationality? E ven if intense
urges of certain kinds are pro perly characterized as symp tom s a nd
are not the agent's fault , no agent always experiences those urge s
with th e requisite intensity to diminish rationality. Between peri ods
when the urges are intense, most agents are capable of substantia l
rationality.
If an agent knows from experience that the urges are recurre nt
and that on previous occasions the agent has acted on those urges
in a state of diminished rationality, the agent also knows during
more rational moments that he is at risk for acting in such a state in
the future. It is a citizen's duty in such circumstances to take all
reasonable steps to prevent oneself from acting wrongly in an irrational state in the future, including drastically limiting one's life
activities if such an intrusive step is necessary to prevent serious
harm. If the agent does not take such steps, the agent may indeed
be responsible, even if at the moment of acting he suffers from substantially compromised capacity for rationality. The situation
would be analogous to the case of a person who suffered from a
physical disorder that recurrently produced irrational mental states
or blackouts during which the person caused harm, but who did not
take sufficient steps to prevent such harm in the future. We would
111
surely not excuse such an agent. Even if it is predictable that the
agent will not take those steps and will behave non-responsibly an d
dangerously in the future, recall that predictability is not per se a

Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. 360 (Macmillan & Co. 1912). See also supra note 89
(discussing the gun hypothetical).
111
See, e.g. , People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956) (upholding the conviction
for culpable homicide of the driver of an automobile who suffered from epilepsy.
experienced a seizure that caused unconsciousness. and caused death while
unconscious).
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non- responsibility condition. 112 Thus. many of the predators who
become substantially irrational at the time of their sexual assaults
m ay nonetheless be responsible and may deserve conviction, but
the ir condition might not warrant indefinite involuntary civil confineme nt.
A nother important co nside rati on conce rnin g th e rationalit y of
se xua l predators concern s th e relation be twee n psychopathy an d
sexual violence. Although th e criteria for psychopathy are some\vhat controversial, it is best characte ri zed as a psychologic al
a bnormality marked by, inte r alia, an incapacity for empathy, guilt.
an d re morse, and by impulsivity, egocentricity, and chronic violatio ns of social, moral, and legal norms. 1 JJ The condition is not
synonymous with the recognized disorder , Antisocial Personality
Diso rder (" APD") , that the Diagnostic and Statistical Ivianual of
Me ntal Disorders contains, but some people with psychopathy
m ee t t he criteria for APD , and some people with APD also suffer
114
from psychopathy. The lack of capacity for empathy, guilt, and
remorse is one of the factors that differentiates the two conditions .
T his lack of capacity is a necessary feature of psychopathy but not
of A PD. Otherwise, unless they have a co-occurring psychotic disorder, people with psychopathy are entirely in touch with reality,
instrumentally rational, and know the applicable moral and legal
rul es. They simply do not "get" the point of morality and cannot be
guided by it. They are guided only by the fear of sanctions.
Now, suppose that the predator lacks the capacity for empathy,
guilt, and remorse. Such affective capacities provide people with
t he best reasons and motivation not to harm others. For most citizens, conscience and empathy are the most powerful prophylaxes
against wrong conduct and are much more powerful than fear of

lie Co mpare the case of a recidivist fe lon who always commits crimes und er the
intlu e nce of mind-alte ring substa nces that th e fe lon tak es for the purpose of
bo lste ring his courage. Altho ugh the fe lon knows th a t the substances will diminish his
ra ti o nality, and we know that substa nce use and subse qu e nt irrationality is an entire ly
predict able modus operandi, th e felon would be criminally responsible and not civilly
co mmittable.
II.' See Robert D. Hare, Psycho pa ths and Their Nature : Implications for the Mental
H ea lth and Criminal Justice Syste ms , in Psychop athy: Antisocial, Criminal and
Violent Behavior 188 (Theodo re Millon et al. eds., 1998) .
11 ' A lv A. DahL Psychopath y and Psychiatric Comorbiclity, in Millon et al. , s upra
note 11 3, a t 291-92.
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the criminal sa ncti o n. If the se capacities are lacking, it is plausible
to argue that the agent lacks moral rati onali ty and is not resp onsible , even if the age nt is in to uch with rea lity ot herwise and knows
11
th e moral rules in the narrowes t sense . ' In crimin al law, of course,
lack of these capaciti es is not a n excusing condition , a lthough such
11
a defect sure ly pred isp oses an agent to do '<Vrong. '' T hus, although
so me sexual predators rnay lack conscience and empathy beca use
they al so suffer from psyc hopa thy, in our lega l cu lture, psyc hopathy is not a promising normative ground for non- re sponsibil ity .
It would, of course, be poss ible to claim t hat a lack of capacity
for conscience and empctthy is adequa te grou nd for the co nclusion
thctt th e e~gent is suffici e ntly irrational and non-responsible to justify ind efinite civil com mi tment. The civil commitm ent and criminal
justice systems can employ di ffere nt rationality standards. B ut if an
agent is sufficiently rati onal to deserve criminal con viction and
p unishme nt, the most intrusive, afflictive actions the state can impose on a citizen, the agent is surely rati onal enough to be left at
liberty until the agent commits a crime or becomes genuin ely nonresponsible. Civil commitment should be justifie d only in cases in
which the agent's rationality is sufficiently impaired also to avoid
11 7
crimina1 responsibility .
So far, it appears that application of the lack of the capacity for
rationality standard leads to the conclusion that most sexual predators are responsible for sexually violent conduct. In some cases,
however, we may plausibly infer th at sexual predators m ay have a
general , rather than an intermittent , time-limi ted defect in the capacity for rationality th at might genuine ly undermin e respo nsibility
for sexually predatory behavior. For exampl e, suppose the preda,,; See Susa n Wolf, Freedom Within Reason 121 (1990); see also David Gauthi er,
Morals By Agreement 327-28 (1986) (arguin g that mora l co nduct requires agents to
h ave an "a ffectiv e cap acity for morality,' ' described as the ca pacity to have their
"emotion s and fee lings e ngaged by what they recognize as mora l considera tions ").
''' Mode l Penal Code§ 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
117 This might suggest that civilly commi ttab le sexual predators wh o have been
co nvicted should have bee n acq uitted by reaso n of in sanity and t he n committed on
th a t unco ntrove rsial gro und , there by obvia ting the need fo r sex ual predator
commitments . In so me cases, however, it is possibl e tha t, a lthough the preda to r was
responsible a t th e tim e of the cri me, the predato r's co nditi on de te riorated thereafte r,
and he is no lon ger respo nsibl e at the time of commitment. I assume that such cases
would be few. Furth ermore, incre asing age dimini shes th e prob ability o f vio le nt
cond uct.
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ti o n has been frequent , it has previously led to conviction and imprisonment, and incarceration is a profoundly unpleasant experience
for the predator. Such a history is precise ly th e type that justifies a
recognized psychi atric diagnosis. Even in the a bse nce of psycho tic
cognition. in som e cases continued predation simply may not ma ke
rati o nal se nse either to the predator or to anyone else. The predator may have no reasonable explanation for why he did not tic
hirn se lf to the ma st, did not take the preve ntive measures necessa ry
to avoid hated imprisonment. The agent simpl y ca nnot think
straight about what to do, even when not aroused, and continues to
put hims e lf in harm's way without, appare ntly , the rational capac ity
to deliberate about how to avoid such situations.
O ne can speculate about the mechanism that produces a genera l
lack of capacity for rationality in such cases, but such speculation is
less important than the recognition that a small numbe r of sexual
predators may have a rationality defect that extends generally over
the domain of sexual behavior. These cases will be worrisome because the predator will otherwise seem responsible. Depending on
the history, however, a conclusion of non-responsibility about sexual behavior may be warranted, and involuntary civil commitment
might be justified. Leroy Hendricks may have presented precisely
this case. I assume that such cases will be few, and that, in many of
them , the predator should have been acquitted by reaso n of insanity and uncontroversially committed on that ground.
In addition to being the best positive and normative explanation
of non-responsibility, lack of capacity for rationality also may be
easily and reliably evaluated. It is an ordinary, everyday, common
sense standard that we all use all the time to evaluate the behavior
of ourselves and others. Lay people may not know the causes and
correlates of rationality defects, but they surely know such defects
when they see them. Rationality defects are the core of a m ental
health professional's clinical expertise. The inability of mental
health science fully to understand the biological, psychological, or
sociological causes of rationality defects does not preve nt lay people and experts alike from effectively evaluating the capacity for
rationality. Human beings recognized incomprehensible irrationality in others long before they had an inkling of the genuine causal
variables that might produce such a state.
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Using a rationalit y standard will permit me ntal hea lth professionals re adily to explain and legal decisionmak e rs eas ily to
und e rst and th e precise behavioral grounds for inferrin g that a n
age nt suffers fro m ra tionality defects. What is primarily required is
simply a thick descripti o n of th e agent's cognitive , emot iona l, and
be havi oral functioning, a nd, ultim ate ly, of the age n t's reaso ns for
action. Good clini cia ns are trained to ob tain such t horou gh description s by ca reful clini ca l evaluation using multipl e d a ta so urces,
and th ey are the raw materials that all peop le usc to assess
rationality. Experts eva lu ating the r ationality sta nd a rd will be able
to avoid the type of un scientific, conclusory reasonin g th at marks
conclusions about control defects, and legal eva luati on will be uncontaminated by confusing, metaphorical e vide nce. F ina lly, lega l
decisionmakers can decide, without confusion , whether an agent's
functioning meets the applicable, normative standard of lack of ration al capacity, because evaluating rationality against some
normative standard is essentially the same type of assessment of rationality that all people make all the time.
In sum, lack of capacity for rationality is the best explanation of
and the most workable standard for non-responsibility. It is also
the best explanation of what we really mean when we say that an
agent cannot control himself. Control standards should be understood in terms of rationality defects. When used to assess whether
sexually violent people may be involuntarily civilly committed , the
irrationality standard will provide a morally, politically, and legally
justifiable limiting condition for the massive deprivation of liberty
that results.
CO NC LUSION

Liberty and safety are precious to human flourishing , but efforts
to protect both can conflict. Our society protects itself by criminal
punishment and involuntary civil commitment, but both represe nt
massive intrusions on liberty that require weighty justification.
Thus, we limit criminal incarceration to those agents who have culpably committed a crime, and we limit involuntary commitment to
those agents who are not responsible for their legally rel evant behavior, such as dangerous conduct.
Constitutional limitations on the state's p~wer to confin e citizens
based on our concern for liberty inevitably mean that th e protec-
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tion of social safety ca nnot be seamless and that security will be
compromised. Some dangerous but responsible agen ts must remain
free until they commit a crime or until they become nonresponsibl e for th eir potential da nger. As a res ult , our justifiable,
appropria te fear of the harms such people may ca use creates strong
incentives to de vise means to confine them preventive ly. P ure preventive deten tion on gro un ds of dangerous ness alon e is an
anathema in a fre e society, however. and we should not loose n the
standards of non-responsibi li tv to S\YCCD into civi l co nfinement responsible agents who shou ld more appropri ate ly be incapacitated
by criminal sentences. As J ustice Anthony Ke nnedy warned in hi s
concurre nce in Hendricks and as all the Justi ces in Crane app arentl y agreed, civil commitme nt should not be used to impose
punishment or to avo id the effects of deficiencies in the criminal
justice system , such as improvident plea bargains, which might
cause the legally required but objectionably early release of dangerous criminals. w:
States could, of course, achieve essentially indefinite confinement through the criminal justice system by imposing life sentences
on sexual offenders. T here would be no constitutional objection
under current proportionality jurisprudence, 119 and many would accept that such sentences wo uld be deserved . Thus, perhaps we
sho uld not worry about the potentially extensive reach of various
control criteria for the civil commitment of sexual predators because sexually violent offende rs will remain incarcerated for very
long periods in any case. But this would be an un acceptably skeptical, consequential approach to the danger sexual predation presents. 1211
o

l

1
" Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S . 407, 122 S. Ct. 856,862 (2002) (Kennedy, J. , concurring);
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. 373 (1997). Ind eed. Cra ne himself was sentenced to
a re la ti ve ly brief term o f impri sonme nt as a result of a pl ea bargain un der
circu mstances th a t might o th e rwi se have justifie d a priso n te rm of thirty-five yea rs to
life. In re C rane , 3 P.3cl 285, 287 ( Kan. 2000).
119
Harme lin v. Michigan, 501 U.S . 957 (1991 ) (upholdi ng a sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of p a ro le for a first-t im e offender conv icted of possessing 672
grams o f cocaine and holdin g that the E ighth Amendm ent conta in s no proportionality
guara ntee applicable to terms of impri so nment, except, perhaps, for a ridicul o usly
ex tre me case such as life imprisonment for a parking viol a ti o n).
1
"'Thi s objection al so bears a st unning resemblance to p as t cl a ims that th e insa nity
d e fense should be aboli shed because pe ople acqu itted by reaso n of insanity are
incarce ra ted in any case. See J osep h Goldstein & J ay Ka tz, Abo li sh the " Insan ity
Defe nse"-W hy not? , 72 Ya le L.J. 853, 864- 70 ( 1963) . T hese cla ims we r e misgu ide d
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T he law sets moral standards and should be cle a r about which
agents are respo nsi ble . Moreover, if sexual d;;mgerousness were
treated virtuall y e xclusivel y within th e crimi na l jus ti ce system , legislators woul d be fo rced to confro nt and to defen d , in the poli tica l
process, th e sen tences they are wil lin g to impose on sex ual offe nders, rath er t han sweepi ng this morall y-fraugh t question unde r the
psychiatric rug. fi na ll y, prosec utors wou ld be fo rce d straightfor··
-,vardly to ev aluate th e stre ngth of th eir cDscs and would no t be
a ble to rely on ci vil commi tme nt to remedy the effec ts of we ak
cases or impro vid ent ol ea ba rga ins.
Indefinite involu ntary civil commi tm en t sho uld be imposed only
if an agent is genuinely non -responsi ble. Ca used link standards ,
which require onl y th a t so me mental a bnormality predispose t he
agent to sexually violent conduct , are not limiting conditions, even
in principle , because a causal link does not entail nonresponsibility. Moreover, lay peopl e commonly b ut erroneously infe r non-responsibility from th e presence of a ca usa l link, so this
standard may be prejudicial and confusing, as well as overinclusive. T he causal link standard thus poses an unacceptable
threat to civil liberty because it would permit the indefinite involuntary civil commitment of large numbers of alleged predators who
are in fact responsible and who should be incapacita ted by appropriate criminal punishment.
Loss of control is a limiting standard in principle fo r justifiable
involuntary commitment, but it is conceptually confused and fails
to provide adequate guidance either to experts who evaluate alleged sexual predators or to legal decisionmakers who must decide
if an alleged predator is not responsible . A lthough the majority in
Crane properly rejected a pure caus al link standard and sought a
genuinely limiting standard that would identify non-responsible
sexual predators, the serious lack of control standard canno t sa tisfy
the purpose for which it was designed. It will provide no practical
limit to civil commitme nt of sexually violent people.
Lack of capacity for ration ality is the best and most workable
non-responsibility standard. It provid es a prope r lim itation on the
scope of involuntary commitment and the most un derstandable ,
practical guidance to me ntal he alth professionals and legal deci1

~

for the sa me reaso ns that it is impo rt a nt to di stin gui sh re spo nsibl e fro m non respo nsibl e sex ual pred a tors.
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sionmak ers. Co ntrol defects sho uld be und erstood a nd adjudicated
in term s of rationality defect s, which are the best explanation of
co ntrol problems. Th e ration a lit y standard thus provides th e bes t
safeguard both of civil liberty a nd of the distinction betwee n ci vil
a nd criminal justice.

